Sellars on modality: possible worlds and rules of inference

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216208%3A11210%2F24%3A10490308" target="_blank" >RIV/00216208:11210/24:10490308 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://verso.is.cuni.cz/pub/verso.fpl?fname=obd_publikace_handle&handle=mi8IuAiNc6" target="_blank" >https://verso.is.cuni.cz/pub/verso.fpl?fname=obd_publikace_handle&handle=mi8IuAiNc6</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2023.2242895" target="_blank" >10.1080/09608788.2023.2242895</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Sellars on modality: possible worlds and rules of inference

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

This paper discusses the account of alethic modality as presented by Wilfrid Sellars in his earlier work from 1947 to 1958. Its aim is twofold. First, I discuss Sellars&apos; analysis by exploring its historical relationship to Carnap&apos;s account of modality. I argue that Carnap&apos;s early syntactic treatment of modality profoundly influenced Sellars&apos; own so-called &apos;regulist&apos; account of modality in terms of rules of inference. Furthermore, it is suggested that Sellars&apos; lesser-known possible worlds analysis was influenced by Carnap&apos;s later semantic account of modality. The second aim of the paper is a critical one. I raise a number of objections to Sellars&apos; account of modality and argue that his account confronts some serious limitations. I also argue that Sellars does not provide a satisfying explanation of the relationship between his regulist account and his possible worlds analysis. I offer such an explanation by arguing that his regulist account should be understood as a pragmatic account of what is conveyed by the use of modal sentences, whereas his possible worlds analysis is a semantic account of the asserted content of modal statements. That is, the regulist account and the possible worlds analysis have different explanatory targets.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Sellars on modality: possible worlds and rules of inference

Popis výsledku anglicky

This paper discusses the account of alethic modality as presented by Wilfrid Sellars in his earlier work from 1947 to 1958. Its aim is twofold. First, I discuss Sellars&apos; analysis by exploring its historical relationship to Carnap&apos;s account of modality. I argue that Carnap&apos;s early syntactic treatment of modality profoundly influenced Sellars&apos; own so-called &apos;regulist&apos; account of modality in terms of rules of inference. Furthermore, it is suggested that Sellars&apos; lesser-known possible worlds analysis was influenced by Carnap&apos;s later semantic account of modality. The second aim of the paper is a critical one. I raise a number of objections to Sellars&apos; account of modality and argue that his account confronts some serious limitations. I also argue that Sellars does not provide a satisfying explanation of the relationship between his regulist account and his possible worlds analysis. I offer such an explanation by arguing that his regulist account should be understood as a pragmatic account of what is conveyed by the use of modal sentences, whereas his possible worlds analysis is a semantic account of the asserted content of modal statements. That is, the regulist account and the possible worlds analysis have different explanatory targets.

Druh

J_SC - Článek v periodiku v databázi SCOPUS

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2024

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

British Journal for the History of Philosophy

ISSN

0960-8788

e-ISSN

1469-3526

Svazek periodika

32

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

3

Stát vydavatele periodika

GB - Spojené království Velké Británie a Severního Irska

Počet stran výsledku

26

Strana od-do

606-631

Kód UT WoS článku

—

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85168873594