Sellars, practical reality, and practical truth
Identifikátory výsledku
Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F49777513%3A23330%2F23%3A43968479" target="_blank" >RIV/49777513:23330/23:43968479 - isvavai.cz</a>
Výsledek na webu
<a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/theo.12462" target="_blank" >https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/theo.12462</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/theo.12462" target="_blank" >10.1111/theo.12462</a>
Alternativní jazyky
Jazyk výsledku
angličtina
Název v původním jazyce
Sellars, practical reality, and practical truth
Popis výsledku v původním jazyce
Wilfrid Sellars is usually read as claiming that only the unobservable, theoretical objects which science would postulate at the ideal end of inquiry are real. Against this, Willem deVries has suggested that we can develop a notion of practical reality in the context of Sellars's philosophy which would pertain primarily to commonsense objects. I use deVries's suggestion as a foil to clarify Sellars's own commitments about the practical. I show that the notion of practical reality is not necessary to secure the ultimate legitimacy of practical concepts. We can retreat to the less committed notion of practical truth. I argue that the notion of practical truth may not be sufficient to ensure that ultimately legitimate practical concepts are commonsense concepts in Sellars's framework. Nevertheless, deVries's suggestion highlights that Sellars's vision of an ultimate conceptual system may have been richer than is often thought.
Název v anglickém jazyce
Sellars, practical reality, and practical truth
Popis výsledku anglicky
Wilfrid Sellars is usually read as claiming that only the unobservable, theoretical objects which science would postulate at the ideal end of inquiry are real. Against this, Willem deVries has suggested that we can develop a notion of practical reality in the context of Sellars's philosophy which would pertain primarily to commonsense objects. I use deVries's suggestion as a foil to clarify Sellars's own commitments about the practical. I show that the notion of practical reality is not necessary to secure the ultimate legitimacy of practical concepts. We can retreat to the less committed notion of practical truth. I argue that the notion of practical truth may not be sufficient to ensure that ultimately legitimate practical concepts are commonsense concepts in Sellars's framework. Nevertheless, deVries's suggestion highlights that Sellars's vision of an ultimate conceptual system may have been richer than is often thought.
Klasifikace
Druh
J<sub>SC</sub> - Článek v periodiku v databázi SCOPUS
CEP obor
—
OECD FORD obor
60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology
Návaznosti výsledku
Projekt
<a href="/cs/project/GA20-04496S" target="_blank" >GA20-04496S: Jak zkonstruovat pragmatismus - Wilfrid Sellars a pragmatistická tradice</a><br>
Návaznosti
P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)
Ostatní
Rok uplatnění
2023
Kód důvěrnosti údajů
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Údaje specifické pro druh výsledku
Název periodika
Theoria
ISSN
0040-5825
e-ISSN
1755-2567
Svazek periodika
89
Číslo periodika v rámci svazku
5
Stát vydavatele periodika
SE - Švédské království
Počet stran výsledku
21
Strana od-do
571-591
Kód UT WoS článku
—
EID výsledku v databázi Scopus
2-s2.0-85153502842