Lecture at conference: The Ethical and Legal Problems in Mind-Uploading - Identity and Consciousness as Foundational Constraints

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F49777513%3A23330%2F25%3A43976572" target="_blank" >RIV/49777513:23330/25:43976572 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

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DOI - Digital Object Identifier

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Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Lecture at conference: The Ethical and Legal Problems in Mind-Uploading - Identity and Consciousness as Foundational Constraints

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

This conference paper addresses two problems concerning the conception of mind-uploading - a hypothetical process of transferring human mental contents, memories,and personality into an artificial computational system.Drawing on work by R. Weir, D. Parfit, D. Chalmers, and N. Block, the paper arguesthat attempts to deal with specific ethical and legal issues concerning this conceptionare, in fact, constrained by two key underlying problems.The first problem pertains to whether the uploaded ‘digital person’ can be consideredpersonally identical to one prior to undergoing this process. (Weir, R. 2023, Parfit, D.1973, 2001). The second problem concerns artificial phenomenal consciousness:Even the successful uploading of the mental contents of a particular person into anartificial system that is functionally isomorphic to the human mind (of that veryindividual) does not automatically guarantee the presence of phenomenalconsciousness, qualia, or ‘what-it-is-likeness’ in such a system (Block, N. 1995;Chalmers, D. 1995).The paper presents several ethical and legal dilemmas concerning mind-uploadingand shows how they can be resolved based on the different answers to these twoproblems. It argues that the presence of phenomenal consciousness ought todetermine whether we may attribute to the uploaded entity the status of moral agentas well as legal rights of natural persons and secondly, that the personal identity of a‘digital person’ with its original can (if established) determine ascription of moral andlegal continuity to this ‘artificial entity’.Event: 4ICEAI - 4th International Conference on Ethics of Artificial IntelligenceVenue: Porto28.07.2025 - 30.07.2025

Název v anglickém jazyce

Lecture at conference: The Ethical and Legal Problems in Mind-Uploading - Identity and Consciousness as Foundational Constraints

Popis výsledku anglicky

This conference paper addresses two problems concerning the conception of mind-uploading - a hypothetical process of transferring human mental contents, memories,and personality into an artificial computational system.Drawing on work by R. Weir, D. Parfit, D. Chalmers, and N. Block, the paper arguesthat attempts to deal with specific ethical and legal issues concerning this conceptionare, in fact, constrained by two key underlying problems.The first problem pertains to whether the uploaded ‘digital person’ can be consideredpersonally identical to one prior to undergoing this process. (Weir, R. 2023, Parfit, D.1973, 2001). The second problem concerns artificial phenomenal consciousness:Even the successful uploading of the mental contents of a particular person into anartificial system that is functionally isomorphic to the human mind (of that veryindividual) does not automatically guarantee the presence of phenomenalconsciousness, qualia, or ‘what-it-is-likeness’ in such a system (Block, N. 1995;Chalmers, D. 1995).The paper presents several ethical and legal dilemmas concerning mind-uploadingand shows how they can be resolved based on the different answers to these twoproblems. It argues that the presence of phenomenal consciousness ought todetermine whether we may attribute to the uploaded entity the status of moral agentas well as legal rights of natural persons and secondly, that the personal identity of a‘digital person’ with its original can (if established) determine ascription of moral andlegal continuity to this ‘artificial entity’.Event: 4ICEAI - 4th International Conference on Ethics of Artificial IntelligenceVenue: Porto28.07.2025 - 30.07.2025

Druh

O - Ostatní výsledky

CEP obor

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OECD FORD obor

60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology

Projekt

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Návaznosti

S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach

Rok uplatnění

2025

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů