Does a “CEO chairman ” guarantee better performance from a firm ?

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F60460709%3A41110%2F16%3A70964" target="_blank" >RIV/60460709:41110/16:70964 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/danb-2016-0009" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/danb-2016-0009</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/danb-2016-0009" target="_blank" >10.1515/danb-2016-0009</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Does a “CEO chairman ” guarantee better performance from a firm ?

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

This paper provides a brief review of the state of knowledge in the field of agency theory. The managerial power approach assumes that a chief executive officer is able to affect the scale of his or her pay. However, Kaplan (2012) and others see a different picture of the corporate-governance landscape, hence they provide certain market-based explanations for high compensation. Our paper examines the relationship between a firm’s performance and the amount of managerial compensation, and the ability of a CEO to affect a board’s decision regarding his or her total compensation. The dataset consists of 75 companies traded in the capital market in the US. Our panel dataset covers a 10-year period from 2004 to 2013. We developed a single equation panel data model. The resulting parameter values provide a different picture of CEO power and the interconnection between a firm’s performance and CEO pay in both sectors.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Does a “CEO chairman ” guarantee better performance from a firm ?

Popis výsledku anglicky

This paper provides a brief review of the state of knowledge in the field of agency theory. The managerial power approach assumes that a chief executive officer is able to affect the scale of his or her pay. However, Kaplan (2012) and others see a different picture of the corporate-governance landscape, hence they provide certain market-based explanations for high compensation. Our paper examines the relationship between a firm’s performance and the amount of managerial compensation, and the ability of a CEO to affect a board’s decision regarding his or her total compensation. The dataset consists of 75 companies traded in the capital market in the US. Our panel dataset covers a 10-year period from 2004 to 2013. We developed a single equation panel data model. The resulting parameter values provide a different picture of CEO power and the interconnection between a firm’s performance and CEO pay in both sectors.

Druh

J_SC - Článek v periodiku v databázi SCOPUS

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

50202 - Applied Economics, Econometrics

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach

Rok uplatnění

2016

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Danube: Law and Economics Review

ISSN

1804-8285

e-ISSN

—

Svazek periodika

7

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

3

Stát vydavatele periodika

CZ - Česká republika

Počet stran výsledku

16

Strana od-do

145-160

Kód UT WoS článku

—

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-84994444668