Hacking the Least Trusted Node: Indirect Eavesdropping in Quantum Networks

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F61989100%3A27240%2F24%3A10256062" target="_blank" >RIV/61989100:27240/24:10256062 - isvavai.cz</a>

Nalezeny alternativní kódy

RIV/61989100:27740/24:10256062

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10741278" target="_blank" >https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10741278</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2024.3490378" target="_blank" >10.1109/ACCESS.2024.3490378</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Hacking the Least Trusted Node: Indirect Eavesdropping in Quantum Networks

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

We study the significance of the common trusted relay assumption in quantum networks. While most practical implementations of quantum networks rely on trusted devices, the question of security without this assumption has been rarely addressed. Device independent security attempts to minimize the assumptions made on the quantum hardware, entanglement based methods try to avoid relays to the extent possible, and multipath transmission improves robustness and security by enforcing the attacker to conquer more than just a single intermediate node. Common to all these past studies is their focus on the physical layer and direct connections. We describe an attack from the networking and routing layer. Assuming at least one node that is not perfectly tamper-proof, meaning that an attacker has established a foothold to read traffic from the inside, we show how to exploit the eavesdropping detection mechanisms of the quantum key distribution (QKD) devices to cause traffic redirection over the vulnerable node, thus defeating security under the trusted node assumption. We experimentally demonstrate how the attack works on networks of different size and topology, and thereby further substantiate the significance of the trust assumptions for end-to-end security of QKD networks.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Hacking the Least Trusted Node: Indirect Eavesdropping in Quantum Networks

Popis výsledku anglicky

We study the significance of the common trusted relay assumption in quantum networks. While most practical implementations of quantum networks rely on trusted devices, the question of security without this assumption has been rarely addressed. Device independent security attempts to minimize the assumptions made on the quantum hardware, entanglement based methods try to avoid relays to the extent possible, and multipath transmission improves robustness and security by enforcing the attacker to conquer more than just a single intermediate node. Common to all these past studies is their focus on the physical layer and direct connections. We describe an attack from the networking and routing layer. Assuming at least one node that is not perfectly tamper-proof, meaning that an attacker has established a foothold to read traffic from the inside, we show how to exploit the eavesdropping detection mechanisms of the quantum key distribution (QKD) devices to cause traffic redirection over the vulnerable node, thus defeating security under the trusted node assumption. We experimentally demonstrate how the attack works on networks of different size and topology, and thereby further substantiate the significance of the trust assumptions for end-to-end security of QKD networks.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

20203 - Telecommunications

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/VJ01010008" target="_blank" >VJ01010008: Kybernetická bezpečnost sítí v postkvantové éře</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2024

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

IEEE Access

ISSN

2169-3536

e-ISSN

—

Svazek periodika

12

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

November

Stát vydavatele periodika

US - Spojené státy americké

Počet stran výsledku

9

Strana od-do

160973-160981

Kód UT WoS článku

001349777300001

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

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