Role Swap: When the Follower Leads and the Leader Follows

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F61989100%3A27510%2F21%3A10248425" target="_blank" >RIV/61989100:27510/21:10248425 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://journal.fsv.cuni.cz/mag/article/show/id/1491" target="_blank" >https://journal.fsv.cuni.cz/mag/article/show/id/1491</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.32065/CJEF.2021.04.02" target="_blank" >10.32065/CJEF.2021.04.02</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Role Swap: When the Follower Leads and the Leader Follows

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

The game theoretic literature has commonly explored circumstances in which the players are identical. In the real world, strategic actors such as competing firms or political parties are however heterogeneous. Most importantly, their payoffs across the various possible outcomes generally differ. We consider payoff heterogeneity within a more general &apos;Stochastic leadership&apos; framework. It allows for probabilistic revisions of each player&apos;s initial actions - upon observing what the others have done. The analysis shows that under Stochastic leadership it is the exact payoffs, not just their ranking, that affects the set of (subgame-perfect) equilibria. This is consistent with experimental studies that show payoff heterogeneity to hinder cooperation and aggravate conflict by moving the players away from the focal (symmetric/equitable) outcome. Furthermore, we demonstrate that if the payoffs are sufficiently asymmetric the players may essentially swap their roles in coordination and anti-coordination games. In particular, we derive circumstances within the Battle of the sexes, Stag hunt and Hawk and dove games under which the Stochastic follower (the more flexible player with a higher revision probability) starts behaving as the Stackelberg leader. Our main real-world example is from the area of climate change agreements between major countries.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Role Swap: When the Follower Leads and the Leader Follows

Popis výsledku anglicky

The game theoretic literature has commonly explored circumstances in which the players are identical. In the real world, strategic actors such as competing firms or political parties are however heterogeneous. Most importantly, their payoffs across the various possible outcomes generally differ. We consider payoff heterogeneity within a more general &apos;Stochastic leadership&apos; framework. It allows for probabilistic revisions of each player&apos;s initial actions - upon observing what the others have done. The analysis shows that under Stochastic leadership it is the exact payoffs, not just their ranking, that affects the set of (subgame-perfect) equilibria. This is consistent with experimental studies that show payoff heterogeneity to hinder cooperation and aggravate conflict by moving the players away from the focal (symmetric/equitable) outcome. Furthermore, we demonstrate that if the payoffs are sufficiently asymmetric the players may essentially swap their roles in coordination and anti-coordination games. In particular, we derive circumstances within the Battle of the sexes, Stag hunt and Hawk and dove games under which the Stochastic follower (the more flexible player with a higher revision probability) starts behaving as the Stackelberg leader. Our main real-world example is from the area of climate change agreements between major countries.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

50201 - Economic Theory

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GA19-19485S" target="_blank" >GA19-19485S: Prostorová dynamika a nerovnost: Role konektivity a přístupu k financím</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2021

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Finance a úvěr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance

ISSN

0015-1920

e-ISSN

—

Svazek periodika

71

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

4

Stát vydavatele periodika

CZ - Česká republika

Počet stran výsledku

24

Strana od-do

282-305

Kód UT WoS článku

000739835800003

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85122098526