Macro Meets Micro: Stochastic (Calvo) Revisions in Games

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F61989100%3A27510%2F13%3A86087993" target="_blank" >RIV/61989100:27510/13:86087993 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/bejte.2014.14.issue-1/bejte-2013-0042/bejte-2013-0042.xml" target="_blank" >http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/bejte.2014.14.issue-1/bejte-2013-0042/bejte-2013-0042.xml</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2013-0042" target="_blank" >10.1515/bejte-2013-0042</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Macro Meets Micro: Stochastic (Calvo) Revisions in Games

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

The timing of moves in conventional games is deterministic. To better capture the uncertainty of many real world situations, we postulate a stochastic timing framework. The players get a revision opportunity at a pre-specified time (common to them) withsome known probability (different across them). The probabilistic revisions resemble the Calvo (1983) timing widely used in macroeconomics, and by nesting the standard simultaneous move game and Stackelberg leadership they can serve as a `dynamic commitment' device. The analysis shows how the revision time and probabilities affect the outcomes in games with multiple and/or inefficient equilibria. Unsurprisingly, we show in the Battle of the sexes that commitment - low revision probability relative to the opponent - improves the player's chances to uniquely achieve his preferred outcome (i.e. to dominate). What may however seem surprising is that the less committed (higher revision probability) player may dominate the game under some cir

Název v anglickém jazyce

Macro Meets Micro: Stochastic (Calvo) Revisions in Games

Popis výsledku anglicky

The timing of moves in conventional games is deterministic. To better capture the uncertainty of many real world situations, we postulate a stochastic timing framework. The players get a revision opportunity at a pre-specified time (common to them) withsome known probability (different across them). The probabilistic revisions resemble the Calvo (1983) timing widely used in macroeconomics, and by nesting the standard simultaneous move game and Stackelberg leadership they can serve as a `dynamic commitment' device. The analysis shows how the revision time and probabilities affect the outcomes in games with multiple and/or inefficient equilibria. Unsurprisingly, we show in the Battle of the sexes that commitment - low revision probability relative to the opponent - improves the player's chances to uniquely achieve his preferred outcome (i.e. to dominate). What may however seem surprising is that the less committed (higher revision probability) player may dominate the game under some cir

Druh

J_x - Nezařazeno - Článek v odborném periodiku (Jimp, Jsc a Jost)

CEP obor

AH - Ekonomie

OECD FORD obor

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Projekt

Výsledek vznikl pri realizaci vícero projektů. Více informací v záložce Projekty.

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2013

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics

ISSN

1935-1704

e-ISSN

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Svazek periodika

14

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

1

Stát vydavatele periodika

DE - Spolková republika Německo

Počet stran výsledku

31

Strana od-do

339-369

Kód UT WoS článku

000340292500012

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

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