Corporate social responsibility and network externalities: a game-theoretic approach

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F61989100%3A27510%2F24%3A10253769" target="_blank" >RIV/61989100:27510/24:10253769 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10479-023-05601-1" target="_blank" >https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10479-023-05601-1</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10479-023-05601-1" target="_blank" >10.1007/s10479-023-05601-1</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Corporate social responsibility and network externalities: a game-theoretic approach

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

This research revisits the pioneering work by Katz and Shapiro (Am Econom Rev 75:424-440, 1985) with network (consumption) externalities in a twofold way: first, it considers Corporate Socially Responsible (CSR), instead of profit-maximising, firms; second, it uses a game-theoretic approach and analyses the commitment decision game in which firms face the binary choice to credibly commit (C) or not to commit (NC) themselves to an announced output level in the first decision-making stage. Competition at the market stage occurs &amp; agrave; la Cournot. Results show a rich spectrum of sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) outcomes, ranging from the prisoner&apos;s dilemma (self-interest and mutual benefit of output commitment conflict) to the anti-prisoner&apos;s dilemma or deadlock (self-interest and mutual benefit of output commitment do not conflict), passing from the coordination to the anti-coordination game. These outcomes depend on the intensity of the social concern in the firm&apos;s objective and the network size. The article also pinpoints the welfare outcomes corresponding to the SPNE and extends the analysis to a Stackelberg rivalry setting.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Corporate social responsibility and network externalities: a game-theoretic approach

Popis výsledku anglicky

This research revisits the pioneering work by Katz and Shapiro (Am Econom Rev 75:424-440, 1985) with network (consumption) externalities in a twofold way: first, it considers Corporate Socially Responsible (CSR), instead of profit-maximising, firms; second, it uses a game-theoretic approach and analyses the commitment decision game in which firms face the binary choice to credibly commit (C) or not to commit (NC) themselves to an announced output level in the first decision-making stage. Competition at the market stage occurs &amp; agrave; la Cournot. Results show a rich spectrum of sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) outcomes, ranging from the prisoner&apos;s dilemma (self-interest and mutual benefit of output commitment conflict) to the anti-prisoner&apos;s dilemma or deadlock (self-interest and mutual benefit of output commitment do not conflict), passing from the coordination to the anti-coordination game. These outcomes depend on the intensity of the social concern in the firm&apos;s objective and the network size. The article also pinpoints the welfare outcomes corresponding to the SPNE and extends the analysis to a Stackelberg rivalry setting.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

50202 - Applied Economics, Econometrics

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GA23-06282S" target="_blank" >GA23-06282S: Evoluční ekonomická dynamika s konečnou populací: Modelování a aplikace</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2024

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Annals of Operations Research

ISSN

0254-5330

e-ISSN

1572-9338

Svazek periodika

337

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

3

Stát vydavatele periodika

NL - Nizozemsko

Počet stran výsledku

37

Strana od-do

835-871

Kód UT WoS článku

001086765100001

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85174197541