Perpetual scrutiny? Mutual control among coalition political parties in the executive and parliamentary phases of law-making

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F61989592%3A15210%2F22%3A73619480" target="_blank" >RIV/61989592:15210/22:73619480 - isvavai.cz</a>

Nalezeny alternativní kódy

RIV/00216224:14220/23:00131922 RIV/62690094:18460/23:50019339

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/13540688221085237" target="_blank" >https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/13540688221085237</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/13540688221085237" target="_blank" >10.1177/13540688221085237</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Perpetual scrutiny? Mutual control among coalition political parties in the executive and parliamentary phases of law-making

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

There is an ongoing debate on how political parties that form coalition governments keep tabs on each other during the drafting and negotiation of new bills. Our article complements existing studies focused on the parliamentary stage of law-making by enriching current knowledge with an analysis of the executive phase, where bills may be significantly changed before they are submitted to the legislature. Contrary to theoretical expectations, results based on unique data from the Czech Republic reveal that bills which are heavily altered during the executive phase are subsequently significantly changed in the parliament. Additional interaction models indicate the effect is stronger for bills that are highly significant for the proposing minister and are a greater distance from any coalition compromise. Our findings open the question of why the coalition parties leave the resolution of some controversial issues to the parliamentary phase: the outstanding conflict may be genuine, or the coalition MPs may just be playing out a prearranged and staged battle that enables the coalition partners to show their distinctive qualities to the voters.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Perpetual scrutiny? Mutual control among coalition political parties in the executive and parliamentary phases of law-making

Popis výsledku anglicky

There is an ongoing debate on how political parties that form coalition governments keep tabs on each other during the drafting and negotiation of new bills. Our article complements existing studies focused on the parliamentary stage of law-making by enriching current knowledge with an analysis of the executive phase, where bills may be significantly changed before they are submitted to the legislature. Contrary to theoretical expectations, results based on unique data from the Czech Republic reveal that bills which are heavily altered during the executive phase are subsequently significantly changed in the parliament. Additional interaction models indicate the effect is stronger for bills that are highly significant for the proposing minister and are a greater distance from any coalition compromise. Our findings open the question of why the coalition parties leave the resolution of some controversial issues to the parliamentary phase: the outstanding conflict may be genuine, or the coalition MPs may just be playing out a prearranged and staged battle that enables the coalition partners to show their distinctive qualities to the voters.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

50601 - Political science

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GA17-03806S" target="_blank" >GA17-03806S: Odhalování temného koutu legislativního procesu: Příprava návrhů zákonů exekutivou</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2022

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

PARTY POLITICS

ISSN

1354-0688

e-ISSN

1460-3683

Svazek periodika

29

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

3

Stát vydavatele periodika

US - Spojené státy americké

Počet stran výsledku

12

Strana od-do

489-500

Kód UT WoS článku

000781674600001

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85129138645