Concepts and fuzzy sets: Misunderstandings, misconceptions, and oversights

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F61989592%3A15310%2F09%3A00010271" target="_blank" >RIV/61989592:15310/09:00010271 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

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DOI - Digital Object Identifier

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Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Concepts and fuzzy sets: Misunderstandings, misconceptions, and oversights

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

The psychology of concepts has been undergoing significant changes since the early 1970s, when the classical view of concepts was seriously challenged by convincing experimental evidence that conceptual categories never have sharp boundaries. Some researchers recognized already in the early 1970s that fuzzy set theory and fuzzy logic were potentially suitable for modeling of concepts and obtained encouraging results. This positive attitude abruptly changed in the early 1980s, and since that time fuzzy set theory and fuzzy logic have been portrayed as problematic and unsuitable for representing and dealing with concepts. Our aim in this paper is to identify some of the most notorious claims regarding fuzzy set theory and fuzzy logic that have propagatedthrough the literature on psychology of concepts and to show that they are, by and large, false. We trace the origin and propagation of these claims within the literature in this area. It is shown in detail that these claims are consiste

Název v anglickém jazyce

Concepts and fuzzy sets: Misunderstandings, misconceptions, and oversights

Popis výsledku anglicky

The psychology of concepts has been undergoing significant changes since the early 1970s, when the classical view of concepts was seriously challenged by convincing experimental evidence that conceptual categories never have sharp boundaries. Some researchers recognized already in the early 1970s that fuzzy set theory and fuzzy logic were potentially suitable for modeling of concepts and obtained encouraging results. This positive attitude abruptly changed in the early 1980s, and since that time fuzzy set theory and fuzzy logic have been portrayed as problematic and unsuitable for representing and dealing with concepts. Our aim in this paper is to identify some of the most notorious claims regarding fuzzy set theory and fuzzy logic that have propagatedthrough the literature on psychology of concepts and to show that they are, by and large, false. We trace the origin and propagation of these claims within the literature in this area. It is shown in detail that these claims are consiste

Druh

J_x - Nezařazeno - Článek v odborném periodiku (Jimp, Jsc a Jost)

CEP obor

BD - Teorie informace

OECD FORD obor

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Projekt

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Návaznosti

Z - Vyzkumny zamer (s odkazem do CEZ)

Rok uplatnění

2009

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

International Journal of Approximate Reasoning

ISSN

0888-613X

e-ISSN

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Svazek periodika

51

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

1

Stát vydavatele periodika

US - Spojené státy americké

Počet stran výsledku

12

Strana od-do

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Kód UT WoS článku

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EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

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