Corruption, Rule of Law, and Economic Efficiency: Virginia vs. Chicago Public Choice Theories

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F62156489%3A43110%2F11%3A00179536" target="_blank" >RIV/62156489:43110/11:00179536 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

—

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

—

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Corruption, Rule of Law, and Economic Efficiency: Virginia vs. Chicago Public Choice Theories

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Can corruption improve economic efficiency? Classical political economists argue that corruption undermines the rule of law (Smith 2001, chap 5). The modern Public Choice proponents argue that corruption might influence the efficiency of the rule of law.While Chicago Public Choice scholars model how corruption improves efficiency of the rule of law and thus the overall economic efficiency, the Virginia Public Choice models explain how corruption reduces efficiency of the rule of law and thus the overall economic efficiency. In this short paper, we present a brief survey distinguishing among arguments of the Chicago Public Choice and Virginia Public Choice schools on how corruption influences economic efficiency. We argue that the Virginia Public Choice explanation is more realistic because it includes the influence of bureaucratic corruption.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Corruption, Rule of Law, and Economic Efficiency: Virginia vs. Chicago Public Choice Theories

Popis výsledku anglicky

Can corruption improve economic efficiency? Classical political economists argue that corruption undermines the rule of law (Smith 2001, chap 5). The modern Public Choice proponents argue that corruption might influence the efficiency of the rule of law.While Chicago Public Choice scholars model how corruption improves efficiency of the rule of law and thus the overall economic efficiency, the Virginia Public Choice models explain how corruption reduces efficiency of the rule of law and thus the overall economic efficiency. In this short paper, we present a brief survey distinguishing among arguments of the Chicago Public Choice and Virginia Public Choice schools on how corruption influences economic efficiency. We argue that the Virginia Public Choice explanation is more realistic because it includes the influence of bureaucratic corruption.

Druh

D - Stať ve sborníku

CEP obor

AH - Ekonomie

OECD FORD obor

—

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

Z - Vyzkumny zamer (s odkazem do CEZ)

Rok uplatnění

2011

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název statě ve sborníku

Human Capital and Investment in Education: The Collection of The XIV. International Scientific Conference

ISBN

978-80-7408-057-9

ISSN

—

e-ISSN

—

Počet stran výsledku

14

Strana od-do

99-112

Název nakladatele

University of Finance and Administration

Místo vydání

Prague

Místo konání akce

Prague

Datum konání akce

16. 9. 2011

Typ akce podle státní příslušnosti

WRD - Celosvětová akce

Kód UT WoS článku

—