Corruption, Rule of Law, and Economic Efficiency: Virginia vs. Chicago Public Choice Theories

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F62156489%3A43110%2F12%3A00234953" target="_blank" >RIV/62156489:43110/12:00234953 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://is.vsfs.cz/repo/4811/Grochova_Otahal.pdf?lang=en" target="_blank" >https://is.vsfs.cz/repo/4811/Grochova_Otahal.pdf?lang=en</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

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Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Corruption, Rule of Law, and Economic Efficiency: Virginia vs. Chicago Public Choice Theories

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Can corruption improve economic efficiency? Classical political economists argue that corruption undermines the rule of law (Smith 2001, chap 5). The modern Public Choice proponents argue that corruption and lobbying might influence the efficiency of therule of law. While Chicago Public Choice scholars model how legal lobbying, which is corruption in Virginia Public Choice perspective, improves efficiency of the rule of law and thus the overall economic efficiency, the Virginia Public Choice models explain how corruption reduces efficiency of the rule of law and thus the overall economic efficiency. In this short paper, we present a brief survey distinguishing between arguments of the Chicago Public Choice and Virginia Public Choice schools on how corruption influences economic efficiency. We argue that the Virginia Public Choice explanation is more realistic because it includes the influence of bureaucratic rent-seeking.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Corruption, Rule of Law, and Economic Efficiency: Virginia vs. Chicago Public Choice Theories

Popis výsledku anglicky

Can corruption improve economic efficiency? Classical political economists argue that corruption undermines the rule of law (Smith 2001, chap 5). The modern Public Choice proponents argue that corruption and lobbying might influence the efficiency of therule of law. While Chicago Public Choice scholars model how legal lobbying, which is corruption in Virginia Public Choice perspective, improves efficiency of the rule of law and thus the overall economic efficiency, the Virginia Public Choice models explain how corruption reduces efficiency of the rule of law and thus the overall economic efficiency. In this short paper, we present a brief survey distinguishing between arguments of the Chicago Public Choice and Virginia Public Choice schools on how corruption influences economic efficiency. We argue that the Virginia Public Choice explanation is more realistic because it includes the influence of bureaucratic rent-seeking.

Druh

J_x - Nezařazeno - Článek v odborném periodiku (Jimp, Jsc a Jost)

CEP obor

AH - Ekonomie

OECD FORD obor

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Projekt

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Návaznosti

Z - Vyzkumny zamer (s odkazem do CEZ)

Rok uplatnění

2012

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Acta VŠFS

ISSN

1802-792X

e-ISSN

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Svazek periodika

6

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

2

Stát vydavatele periodika

CZ - Česká republika

Počet stran výsledku

19

Strana od-do

136-154

Kód UT WoS článku

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EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

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