Corruption as a Problem of Parallel Redistribution System

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

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Výsledek na webu

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DOI - Digital Object Identifier

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Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Corruption as a Problem of Parallel Redistribution System

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

We present a model of parallel redistribution system to explain the problem of corruption. Within this model we synthesize both agency theory and rent-seeking. More precisely, we argue that the principal-agent theory has problems accounting for the environment in which the agents offering and accepting corruption operate as well as explaining the importance of the agents for the survival of their environment. The rent-seeking theory, on the other hand, finds it difficult to establish socially effectivelegislation and ways to determine the barriers to entry that motivate agents to behave corruptly. Both problems, however, are central to solving the problem of corruption. Lacking the knowledge of the agent's environment (system) and their significance for the survival of the system, the theory cannot define incentives that would discourage the agent from corrupt behavior. If the rent-seeking theory does not determine the barriers to entry that motivate agents to behave corruptly, it can

Název v anglickém jazyce

Corruption as a Problem of Parallel Redistribution System

Popis výsledku anglicky

We present a model of parallel redistribution system to explain the problem of corruption. Within this model we synthesize both agency theory and rent-seeking. More precisely, we argue that the principal-agent theory has problems accounting for the environment in which the agents offering and accepting corruption operate as well as explaining the importance of the agents for the survival of their environment. The rent-seeking theory, on the other hand, finds it difficult to establish socially effectivelegislation and ways to determine the barriers to entry that motivate agents to behave corruptly. Both problems, however, are central to solving the problem of corruption. Lacking the knowledge of the agent's environment (system) and their significance for the survival of the system, the theory cannot define incentives that would discourage the agent from corrupt behavior. If the rent-seeking theory does not determine the barriers to entry that motivate agents to behave corruptly, it can

Druh

D - Stať ve sborníku

CEP obor

AH - Ekonomie

OECD FORD obor

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Projekt

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Návaznosti

Z - Vyzkumny zamer (s odkazem do CEZ)

Rok uplatnění

2012

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název statě ve sborníku

Modern and Current Trends in the Public Sector Research Proceedings of the 16th International Conference

ISBN

978-80-210-5822-4

ISSN

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e-ISSN

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Počet stran výsledku

9

Strana od-do

234-242

Název nakladatele

Masarykova univerzita

Místo vydání

Brno

Místo konání akce

Brno

Datum konání akce

19. 1. 2012

Typ akce podle státní příslušnosti

WRD - Celosvětová akce

Kód UT WoS článku

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