Corruption, Rule of Law, and Economic Efficiency: Selected Anecdotic Evidence of Bureaucratic Corruption from the Czech and Slovak Republics

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

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Výsledek na webu

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DOI - Digital Object Identifier

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Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Corruption, Rule of Law, and Economic Efficiency: Selected Anecdotic Evidence of Bureaucratic Corruption from the Czech and Slovak Republics

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Can corruption improve economic efficiency? Scholars making economic policy recommendations to resolve corruption problem use several approaches, the most dominant of which are the principal-agent and rent-seeking theories. In this paper, we argue that the principal-agent theory has problems accounting for the environment in which the agents offering and accepting corruption operate, as well as explaining the importance of the agents for the survival of their environment. The rent-seeking theory, on theother hand, finds it difficult to establish socially effective legislation and ways to determine the barriers to entry that motivate agents to behave corruptly. For these reasons we present alternative model of the theory of redistribution systems and its part parallel redistribution games to synthesize both agency theory and rent-seeking and investigate if both problems can be explained and solved. Within our model we present selected quasi-experimental anecdotic evidence from the earl

Název v anglickém jazyce

Corruption, Rule of Law, and Economic Efficiency: Selected Anecdotic Evidence of Bureaucratic Corruption from the Czech and Slovak Republics

Popis výsledku anglicky

Can corruption improve economic efficiency? Scholars making economic policy recommendations to resolve corruption problem use several approaches, the most dominant of which are the principal-agent and rent-seeking theories. In this paper, we argue that the principal-agent theory has problems accounting for the environment in which the agents offering and accepting corruption operate, as well as explaining the importance of the agents for the survival of their environment. The rent-seeking theory, on theother hand, finds it difficult to establish socially effective legislation and ways to determine the barriers to entry that motivate agents to behave corruptly. For these reasons we present alternative model of the theory of redistribution systems and its part parallel redistribution games to synthesize both agency theory and rent-seeking and investigate if both problems can be explained and solved. Within our model we present selected quasi-experimental anecdotic evidence from the earl

Druh

D - Stať ve sborníku

CEP obor

AH - Ekonomie

OECD FORD obor

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Projekt

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Návaznosti

Z - Vyzkumny zamer (s odkazem do CEZ)

Rok uplatnění

2012

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název statě ve sborníku

Human Capital and Financial Management: Proceedings of The XV. International Scientific Conference

ISBN

978-80-7408-071-5

ISSN

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e-ISSN

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Počet stran výsledku

15

Strana od-do

1-15

Název nakladatele

University of Finance and Administration

Místo vydání

Prague

Místo konání akce

Prague

Datum konání akce

24. 9. 2012

Typ akce podle státní příslušnosti

EUR - Evropská akce

Kód UT WoS článku

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