Does social distrust always lead to a stronger support for government intervention?

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F62156489%3A43110%2F14%3A00213520" target="_blank" >RIV/62156489:43110/14:00213520 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="http://ratio.se/media/230400/kouba_pitlik_trust_regulation__wp_227.pdf" target="_blank" >http://ratio.se/media/230400/kouba_pitlik_trust_regulation__wp_227.pdf</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

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Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Does social distrust always lead to a stronger support for government intervention?

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

We address empirically trust as a determinant of support for government intervention. The central notion provided in the present paper is that the influence of generalized social trust on intervention attitudes is conditional on the perceived reliability, honesty, and incorruptibility of state actors and of major companies. Starting point is an idea by Aghion, Algan, Cahuc, and Shleifer (2010) that individuals who generally distrust others have a stronger taste for a regulation of economic activities, while people with high interpersonal trust are in favor of less strict regulations and state control. This line of argumentation neglects that (lack of) trust spills over to distrust in both governmental as well as in private institutions. People who tendto (dis-)trust other unknown people also tend to (dis-)trust state actors and private sector actors. Estimating the determinants of interventionist preferences with data from the World Values Survey/European Values Study for approximatel

Název v anglickém jazyce

Does social distrust always lead to a stronger support for government intervention?

Popis výsledku anglicky

We address empirically trust as a determinant of support for government intervention. The central notion provided in the present paper is that the influence of generalized social trust on intervention attitudes is conditional on the perceived reliability, honesty, and incorruptibility of state actors and of major companies. Starting point is an idea by Aghion, Algan, Cahuc, and Shleifer (2010) that individuals who generally distrust others have a stronger taste for a regulation of economic activities, while people with high interpersonal trust are in favor of less strict regulations and state control. This line of argumentation neglects that (lack of) trust spills over to distrust in both governmental as well as in private institutions. People who tendto (dis-)trust other unknown people also tend to (dis-)trust state actors and private sector actors. Estimating the determinants of interventionist preferences with data from the World Values Survey/European Values Study for approximatel

Druh

O - Ostatní výsledky

CEP obor

AH - Ekonomie

OECD FORD obor

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Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/7E12049" target="_blank" >7E12049: Welfare, Wealth and Work for Europe</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2014

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů