Inferentialism and Normativity of Meaning

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F62690094%3A18460%2F12%3A43866483" target="_blank" >RIV/62690094:18460/12:43866483 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11406-010-9271-8" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11406-010-9271-8</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11406-010-9271-8" target="_blank" >10.1007/s11406-010-9271-8</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Inferentialism and Normativity of Meaning

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

There may be various reasons for claiming that meaning is normative, and additionally, very different senses attached to the claim. However, all such claims have faced fierce resistance from those philosophers who insist that meaning is not normative inany nontrivial sense of the word. In this paper I sketch one particular approach to meaning claiming its normativity and defend it against the antinormativist critique: namely the approach of Brandomian inferentialism. However, my defense is not restricted to inferentialism in any narrow sense for it encompasses a much broader spectrum of approaches to meaning, connected with the Wittgensteinian and especially Sellarsian view of language as an essentially rule-governed enterprise; and indeed I refrain from claiming that the version of inferentialism I present here is in every detail the version developed by Brandom.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Inferentialism and Normativity of Meaning

Popis výsledku anglicky

There may be various reasons for claiming that meaning is normative, and additionally, very different senses attached to the claim. However, all such claims have faced fierce resistance from those philosophers who insist that meaning is not normative inany nontrivial sense of the word. In this paper I sketch one particular approach to meaning claiming its normativity and defend it against the antinormativist critique: namely the approach of Brandomian inferentialism. However, my defense is not restricted to inferentialism in any narrow sense for it encompasses a much broader spectrum of approaches to meaning, connected with the Wittgensteinian and especially Sellarsian view of language as an essentially rule-governed enterprise; and indeed I refrain from claiming that the version of inferentialism I present here is in every detail the version developed by Brandom.

Druh

J_x - Nezařazeno - Článek v odborném periodiku (Jimp, Jsc a Jost)

CEP obor

AA - Filosofie a náboženství

OECD FORD obor

—

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

V - Vyzkumna aktivita podporovana z jinych verejnych zdroju

Rok uplatnění

2012

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Philosophia

ISSN

0048-3893

e-ISSN

—

Svazek periodika

40

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

1

Stát vydavatele periodika

DE - Spolková republika Německo

Počet stran výsledku

23

Strana od-do

75-97

Kód UT WoS článku

000300456200006

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

—