The Assassination of the Austrian Archduke, Sacred Cows, and the Conundrum of Rules

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F62690094%3A18460%2F16%3A50004457" target="_blank" >RIV/62690094:18460/16:50004457 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315676722" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315676722</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315676722" target="_blank" >10.4324/9781315676722</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

The Assassination of the Austrian Archduke, Sacred Cows, and the Conundrum of Rules

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Naturalists believe that norms and rules are not explanatory and that searching for causes is the only reasonable way to improve social sciences. On the other hand, normativists claim that norms and rules exist and there is no way how to reduce what "ought to be" to what "is" without losing something important. With respect to social sciences, they claim that norms and rules are explanatory. I argue that the normativist claim is interesting but wrong. Norms and rules serve us as a criterion for correctness and nothing more and rules will not increase our scientific understanding of any kind of phenomena. There are two main reasons why norms are not explanatory. First, when we try to understand any kind of norms we turn them into normative facts. We just handle them as facts and we search for causal chains. Second, rules and norms are based on a folk psychology and normativists usually assume that folk psychology is somehow correct. Recent progress within cognitive science shows that this assuming might be the crucial problem. I claim that in the light of cognitivist research, normativists' argumentation cannot hold anymore.

Název v anglickém jazyce

The Assassination of the Austrian Archduke, Sacred Cows, and the Conundrum of Rules

Popis výsledku anglicky

Naturalists believe that norms and rules are not explanatory and that searching for causes is the only reasonable way to improve social sciences. On the other hand, normativists claim that norms and rules exist and there is no way how to reduce what "ought to be" to what "is" without losing something important. With respect to social sciences, they claim that norms and rules are explanatory. I argue that the normativist claim is interesting but wrong. Norms and rules serve us as a criterion for correctness and nothing more and rules will not increase our scientific understanding of any kind of phenomena. There are two main reasons why norms are not explanatory. First, when we try to understand any kind of norms we turn them into normative facts. We just handle them as facts and we search for causal chains. Second, rules and norms are based on a folk psychology and normativists usually assume that folk psychology is somehow correct. Recent progress within cognitive science shows that this assuming might be the crucial problem. I claim that in the light of cognitivist research, normativists' argumentation cannot hold anymore.

Druh

C - Kapitola v odborné knize

CEP obor

AA - Filosofie a náboženství

OECD FORD obor

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Projekt

—

Návaznosti

N - Vyzkumna aktivita podporovana z neverejnych zdroju

Rok uplatnění

2016

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název knihy nebo sborníku

12 Normativity and Naturalism in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences

ISBN

978-1-138-93662-1

Počet stran výsledku

17

Strana od-do

194-211

Počet stran knihy

272

Název nakladatele

Routledge

Místo vydání

New York and London

Kód UT WoS kapitoly

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