An Attitude Towards an Artificial Soul? Responses to the “Nazi Chatbot”

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F62690094%3A18460%2F18%3A50014241" target="_blank" >RIV/62690094:18460/18:50014241 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phin.12173" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phin.12173</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phin.12173" target="_blank" >10.1111/phin.12173</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

An Attitude Towards an Artificial Soul? Responses to the “Nazi Chatbot”

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

&quot;The article discusses the case of Microsoft’s Twitter chatbot Tay that “turned into a Nazi” after less than 24 hours from its release on the Internet. The first section presents a brief recapitulation of Alan Turing’s proposal for a test for artificial intelligence and the way it influenced subsequent discussions in the philosophy of mind. In the second section, I offer a few arguments appealing for caution regarding the identification of an accomplished chatbot as a thinking being. These are motivated principally by Ludwig Wittgenstein’s discussions of mind and soul and by some Wittgensteinian philosophers’ criticisms of AI endeavours. I will try to show that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to make sense of AIs such as chatbots as thinking beings, rather independently of their technical perfection and accomplishment. In the third section, the case of the “Nazi chatbot” Tay will offer me material for some light to be shed on the peculiar (primitive) character of our interconnected concepts of thinking, soul and person and on the importance of their further ramified connections.&quot;

Název v anglickém jazyce

An Attitude Towards an Artificial Soul? Responses to the “Nazi Chatbot”

Popis výsledku anglicky

&quot;The article discusses the case of Microsoft’s Twitter chatbot Tay that “turned into a Nazi” after less than 24 hours from its release on the Internet. The first section presents a brief recapitulation of Alan Turing’s proposal for a test for artificial intelligence and the way it influenced subsequent discussions in the philosophy of mind. In the second section, I offer a few arguments appealing for caution regarding the identification of an accomplished chatbot as a thinking being. These are motivated principally by Ludwig Wittgenstein’s discussions of mind and soul and by some Wittgensteinian philosophers’ criticisms of AI endeavours. I will try to show that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to make sense of AIs such as chatbots as thinking beings, rather independently of their technical perfection and accomplishment. In the third section, the case of the “Nazi chatbot” Tay will offer me material for some light to be shed on the peculiar (primitive) character of our interconnected concepts of thinking, soul and person and on the importance of their further ramified connections.&quot;

Druh

J_SC - Článek v periodiku v databázi SCOPUS

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

60302 - Ethics (except ethics related to specific subfields)

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2018

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Philosophical investigations

ISSN

0190-0536

e-ISSN

—

Svazek periodika

41

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

1

Stát vydavatele periodika

GB - Spojené království Velké Británie a Severního Irska

Počet stran výsledku

28

Strana od-do

42-69

Kód UT WoS článku

—

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85029405473