Inscrutability of Reference as a Result of Quine’s Structuralism

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F62690094%3A18460%2F20%3A50016986" target="_blank" >RIV/62690094:18460/20:50016986 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198864288.003.0005" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198864288.003.0005</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198864288.003.0005" target="_blank" >10.1093/oso/9780198864288.003.0005</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Inscrutability of Reference as a Result of Quine’s Structuralism

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

In his later writings Quine is increasingly explicit about that fact that his view of language is, in a certain sense, structuralistic. Structuralist interpretations of non-empirical, especially mathematical theories are now commonplace, but I argue that Quine&apos;s thought experiment with radical translation can be interpreted as showing that even empirical theories cannot be anchored in reality so firmly as to evade the same structuralist nature. Therefore, the peculiar form of structuralism extends to the whole of our theories – the terms of all of them are best seen as meaning not definite substances, but nodes in certain structures. Moreover, radical translation shows – or purports to show – that the structure behind any natural language allows for some non-trivial &quot;automorphisms&quot; – that mapping the meaning of rabbit on that of undetached rabbit part, provided we make an appropriate remapping of many other meanings, does not change the language. Inscrutability of reference is then only a direct consequence. It follows that the objections often raised against Quine – namely that he reaches the absurd identification of rabbits with undetached rabbit parts – miss their point. There are two senses of sameness – &quot;nominal&quot; sameness and sameness &quot;up to isomorphism&quot;; and the point of structuralism is to point out that it is sometimes the latter that is crucial. And this is what is done by Quine – far from denying that rabbits and undetached rabbit parts are – nominally – different things he argues that from the viewpoint of semantics it is not this nominal sameness that is relevant, that the imperative of semantics, as he puts it, is &quot;save the structure and you save all&quot;.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Inscrutability of Reference as a Result of Quine’s Structuralism

Popis výsledku anglicky

In his later writings Quine is increasingly explicit about that fact that his view of language is, in a certain sense, structuralistic. Structuralist interpretations of non-empirical, especially mathematical theories are now commonplace, but I argue that Quine&apos;s thought experiment with radical translation can be interpreted as showing that even empirical theories cannot be anchored in reality so firmly as to evade the same structuralist nature. Therefore, the peculiar form of structuralism extends to the whole of our theories – the terms of all of them are best seen as meaning not definite substances, but nodes in certain structures. Moreover, radical translation shows – or purports to show – that the structure behind any natural language allows for some non-trivial &quot;automorphisms&quot; – that mapping the meaning of rabbit on that of undetached rabbit part, provided we make an appropriate remapping of many other meanings, does not change the language. Inscrutability of reference is then only a direct consequence. It follows that the objections often raised against Quine – namely that he reaches the absurd identification of rabbits with undetached rabbit parts – miss their point. There are two senses of sameness – &quot;nominal&quot; sameness and sameness &quot;up to isomorphism&quot;; and the point of structuralism is to point out that it is sometimes the latter that is crucial. And this is what is done by Quine – far from denying that rabbits and undetached rabbit parts are – nominally – different things he argues that from the viewpoint of semantics it is not this nominal sameness that is relevant, that the imperative of semantics, as he puts it, is &quot;save the structure and you save all&quot;.

Druh

C - Kapitola v odborné knize

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2020

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název knihy nebo sborníku

Quine, Structure, and Ontology

ISBN

978-0-19-886428-8

Počet stran výsledku

14

Strana od-do

82-95

Počet stran knihy

320

Název nakladatele

Oxford university press

Místo vydání

Oxford

Kód UT WoS kapitoly

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