Remembering what is right

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F62690094%3A18460%2F20%3A50017051" target="_blank" >RIV/62690094:18460/20:50017051 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13869795.2020.1711959?journalCode=rpex20" target="_blank" >https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13869795.2020.1711959?journalCode=rpex20</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2020.1711959" target="_blank" >10.1080/13869795.2020.1711959</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Remembering what is right

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

According to Pessimism about moral testimony, it is objectionable to form moral beliefs by deferring to another. This paper motivates Pessimism about another source of moral knowledge: propositional memory. Drawing on a discussion of Gilbert Ryle&apos;s on forgetting the difference between right and wrong, it argues that Internalism about moral motivation offers a satisfying explanation of Pessimism about memory. A central claim of the paper is that Pessimism about memory (and by extension, testimony) is an issue in moral psychology rather than moral epistemology. That is because it is best explained by appeal to claims about the constitution of moral knowledge as a state of mind, rather than requirements on belief formation. The paper also provides reason to suspect that the focus on testimony is something of a red herring.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Remembering what is right

Popis výsledku anglicky

According to Pessimism about moral testimony, it is objectionable to form moral beliefs by deferring to another. This paper motivates Pessimism about another source of moral knowledge: propositional memory. Drawing on a discussion of Gilbert Ryle&apos;s on forgetting the difference between right and wrong, it argues that Internalism about moral motivation offers a satisfying explanation of Pessimism about memory. A central claim of the paper is that Pessimism about memory (and by extension, testimony) is an issue in moral psychology rather than moral epistemology. That is because it is best explained by appeal to claims about the constitution of moral knowledge as a state of mind, rather than requirements on belief formation. The paper also provides reason to suspect that the focus on testimony is something of a red herring.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2020

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Philosophical Explorations

ISSN

1386-9795

e-ISSN

—

Svazek periodika

23

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

1

Stát vydavatele periodika

GB - Spojené království Velké Británie a Severního Irska

Počet stran výsledku

16

Strana od-do

49-64

Kód UT WoS článku

000506899600001

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85078588971