Anthropology without Belief: An Anti-representationalist Ontological Turn
Identifikátory výsledku
Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F62690094%3A18460%2F20%3A50017600" target="_blank" >RIV/62690094:18460/20:50017600 - isvavai.cz</a>
Výsledek na webu
<a href="https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0048393120917967" target="_blank" >https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0048393120917967</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0048393120917967" target="_blank" >10.1177/0048393120917967</a>
Alternativní jazyky
Jazyk výsledku
angličtina
Název v původním jazyce
Anthropology without Belief: An Anti-representationalist Ontological Turn
Popis výsledku v původním jazyce
Rejecting the category of belief is one of the most striking and profound ideas to emerge from the ontological turn. This essay will argue that the rejection of belief is best understood as part of a broader rejection of representationalism. Representationalism regards thought, speech, and intentionality as depending primarily on the mind's ability to manipulate beliefs, ideas, meanings, or similar contents. Some central strands of the ontological turn thus participate in the philosophical project of understanding human life without appeal to such representational states. After showing how 20th century anthropology was implicated in the representationalist picture, this essay will critique some of the arguments against belief found among proponents of the ontological turn. It will then try to construct a more robust argument against the use of the category of belief in anthropology. It ends with some reflections on what it means to do anthropology without belief.
Název v anglickém jazyce
Anthropology without Belief: An Anti-representationalist Ontological Turn
Popis výsledku anglicky
Rejecting the category of belief is one of the most striking and profound ideas to emerge from the ontological turn. This essay will argue that the rejection of belief is best understood as part of a broader rejection of representationalism. Representationalism regards thought, speech, and intentionality as depending primarily on the mind's ability to manipulate beliefs, ideas, meanings, or similar contents. Some central strands of the ontological turn thus participate in the philosophical project of understanding human life without appeal to such representational states. After showing how 20th century anthropology was implicated in the representationalist picture, this essay will critique some of the arguments against belief found among proponents of the ontological turn. It will then try to construct a more robust argument against the use of the category of belief in anthropology. It ends with some reflections on what it means to do anthropology without belief.
Klasifikace
Druh
J<sub>imp</sub> - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science
CEP obor
—
OECD FORD obor
60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology
Návaznosti výsledku
Projekt
<a href="/cs/project/GF17-33808L" target="_blank" >GF17-33808L: Inferencializmus a kolektivní intencionalita</a><br>
Návaznosti
P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)
Ostatní
Rok uplatnění
2020
Kód důvěrnosti údajů
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Údaje specifické pro druh výsledku
Název periodika
Philosophy of the social sciences
ISSN
0048-3931
e-ISSN
—
Svazek periodika
50
Číslo periodika v rámci svazku
6
Stát vydavatele periodika
US - Spojené státy americké
Počet stran výsledku
24
Strana od-do
586-609
Kód UT WoS článku
000535508000001
EID výsledku v databázi Scopus
—