When do voters boycott elections with participation quorums?

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F62690094%3A18460%2F21%3A50017876" target="_blank" >RIV/62690094:18460/21:50017876 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11127-021-00885-y" target="_blank" >https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11127-021-00885-y</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-021-00885-y" target="_blank" >10.1007/s11127-021-00885-y</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

When do voters boycott elections with participation quorums?

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

With participation quorums present in elections and referendums, supporters of the status quo have to decide whether to vote against the proposition or boycott it by abstaining altogether to achieve the same result. This paper examines why one strategy or the other is implemented, using data from recall elections in 376 Peruvian municipalities mandating a 50% participation quorum to validate the removal of the mayor. While instrumental rationality under situations of strategic uncertainty in competitive settings goes far in explaining the incidence of boycotts, a bounded rationality approach whereby actors rely on inferential heuristics through spatial diffusion and past experience produces similarly consistent results. Boycotts are also more likely when voter coordination is easier. Personal traits of the status quo elites, on the other hand, are irrelevant. The paper contributes to the understanding of the quorum paradox warning that measures to increase voter participation, such as the introduction of a participation quorum, may actually depress it.

Název v anglickém jazyce

When do voters boycott elections with participation quorums?

Popis výsledku anglicky

With participation quorums present in elections and referendums, supporters of the status quo have to decide whether to vote against the proposition or boycott it by abstaining altogether to achieve the same result. This paper examines why one strategy or the other is implemented, using data from recall elections in 376 Peruvian municipalities mandating a 50% participation quorum to validate the removal of the mayor. While instrumental rationality under situations of strategic uncertainty in competitive settings goes far in explaining the incidence of boycotts, a bounded rationality approach whereby actors rely on inferential heuristics through spatial diffusion and past experience produces similarly consistent results. Boycotts are also more likely when voter coordination is easier. Personal traits of the status quo elites, on the other hand, are irrelevant. The paper contributes to the understanding of the quorum paradox warning that measures to increase voter participation, such as the introduction of a participation quorum, may actually depress it.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

50601 - Political science

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GA20-02098S" target="_blank" >GA20-02098S: Politická soutěž a lokální demokracie v komparativní perspektivě</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2021

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Public Choice

ISSN

0048-5829

e-ISSN

—

Svazek periodika

189

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

1-2

Stát vydavatele periodika

NL - Nizozemsko

Počet stran výsledku

22

Strana od-do

279-300

Kód UT WoS článku

000621265600002

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85101544890