Normative attitudes

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F62690094%3A18460%2F21%3A50018233" target="_blank" >RIV/62690094:18460/21:50018233 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

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DOI - Digital Object Identifier

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Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Normative attitudes

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Brandom tells us how norms underlie our language and our social practices; and he explains norms as eventually hinging on the normative attitudes of individual participants of the practices. In recent decades interest in normativity has markedly increased not only in philosophy, but also within empirical science (both natural and social sciences); and this provokes the question: is the Brandomian account of norms compatible with what we know about these phenomena from empirical research, and can it be rendered in naturalistic terms? Brandom would disagree, because, according to him, genuine norms are constituted by only correct normative attitudes, which prevents us from reducing the normative to the natural. However, I argue that the most basic normative attitudes cannot be seen as either correct or incorrect (but at most as useful or useless), which paves the way for the naturalization of normative attitudes and hence of norms.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Normative attitudes

Popis výsledku anglicky

Brandom tells us how norms underlie our language and our social practices; and he explains norms as eventually hinging on the normative attitudes of individual participants of the practices. In recent decades interest in normativity has markedly increased not only in philosophy, but also within empirical science (both natural and social sciences); and this provokes the question: is the Brandomian account of norms compatible with what we know about these phenomena from empirical research, and can it be rendered in naturalistic terms? Brandom would disagree, because, according to him, genuine norms are constituted by only correct normative attitudes, which prevents us from reducing the normative to the natural. However, I argue that the most basic normative attitudes cannot be seen as either correct or incorrect (but at most as useful or useless), which paves the way for the naturalization of normative attitudes and hence of norms.

Druh

C - Kapitola v odborné knize

CEP obor

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OECD FORD obor

60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GX20-05180X" target="_blank" >GX20-05180X: Naturalizovaný inferencializmus: normy, významy a důvody ve světě přírody</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2021

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název knihy nebo sborníku

The social institution of discursive norms

ISBN

978-0-367-49208-3

Počet stran výsledku

17

Strana od-do

121-137

Počet stran knihy

288

Název nakladatele

Routledge

Místo vydání

New York and London

Kód UT WoS kapitoly

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