Normative Species - How Naturalized Inferentialism Explains Us

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F62690094%3A18460%2F24%3A50020697" target="_blank" >RIV/62690094:18460/24:50020697 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003388876" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003388876</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003388876" target="_blank" >10.4324/9781003388876</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Normative Species - How Naturalized Inferentialism Explains Us

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

This book is about rules, and especially about human capability to create, maintain and follow rules, as a root of what makes us humans different from other animals. The leading idea is that scrutinizing this capability is able to tell us who we humans are and what kinds of lives we live. It elaborates Wilfrid Sellars&apos; visionary observation that &quot;to say that man is a rational animal, is to say that man is a creature not of habits, but of rules&quot;; and it builds on the ideas of Sellars&apos; and Brandom&apos;s inferentialism, in a novel naturalistic version. The main tenet of inferentialism is that our language games are essentially rule-governed and that meanings are inferential roles. I see the task of reconciliation of inferentialism and naturalism as centered around the problem of naturalization of rules. I argue that the most primitive form of a rule is a cluster of normative attitudes. We humans are specific by our tendency to turn our attitudes on the attitudes themselves, and to do so in a specific way, which turns our &quot;second-order&quot; attitudes into &quot;normative&quot; ones. This self-reflective structure characterizes our ability to create, maintain, and follow systems of interconnected rules. Furthermore, I shows how our most important system of rules—that constitutive of our language—helped to lead us to our current position of rule-following, ultra-social, rational, and discursive creatures.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Normative Species - How Naturalized Inferentialism Explains Us

Popis výsledku anglicky

This book is about rules, and especially about human capability to create, maintain and follow rules, as a root of what makes us humans different from other animals. The leading idea is that scrutinizing this capability is able to tell us who we humans are and what kinds of lives we live. It elaborates Wilfrid Sellars&apos; visionary observation that &quot;to say that man is a rational animal, is to say that man is a creature not of habits, but of rules&quot;; and it builds on the ideas of Sellars&apos; and Brandom&apos;s inferentialism, in a novel naturalistic version. The main tenet of inferentialism is that our language games are essentially rule-governed and that meanings are inferential roles. I see the task of reconciliation of inferentialism and naturalism as centered around the problem of naturalization of rules. I argue that the most primitive form of a rule is a cluster of normative attitudes. We humans are specific by our tendency to turn our attitudes on the attitudes themselves, and to do so in a specific way, which turns our &quot;second-order&quot; attitudes into &quot;normative&quot; ones. This self-reflective structure characterizes our ability to create, maintain, and follow systems of interconnected rules. Furthermore, I shows how our most important system of rules—that constitutive of our language—helped to lead us to our current position of rule-following, ultra-social, rational, and discursive creatures.

Druh

B - Odborná kniha

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GX20-05180X" target="_blank" >GX20-05180X: Naturalizovaný inferencializmus: normy, významy a důvody ve světě přírody</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2024

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

ISBN

978-1-03-248403-7

Počet stran knihy

240

Název nakladatele

Routledge

Místo vydání

New York

Kód UT WoS knihy

—