Modeling Descriptive and Deontic Cognition as Two Modes of Relation between Mind and World

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F62690094%3A18460%2F22%3A50018412" target="_blank" >RIV/62690094:18460/22:50018412 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/papq.12382" target="_blank" >https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/papq.12382</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/papq.12382" target="_blank" >10.1111/papq.12382</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Modeling Descriptive and Deontic Cognition as Two Modes of Relation between Mind and World

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

I use a distinction between single-minded and indifferent choice attitudes, modeled across maximally determinate plans of action, as a basis for interpreting deontic claims – about what ought, ought not, and may be done – as expressing a mode of relation between mind and world that gives voice to the exercise of practical rationality. At the same time, I use maximally determinate possible worlds to model descriptive claims in order to understand them as involving a mode of relation between mind and world that manifests our theoretical rationality. The result is of interest to both linguists looking for a formal treatment of deontic modality that captures the role prescriptive mental states play in our lives, and philosophers interested in substantive questions about action-guiding and representational mental states as exercises of practical and theoretical rationality.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Modeling Descriptive and Deontic Cognition as Two Modes of Relation between Mind and World

Popis výsledku anglicky

I use a distinction between single-minded and indifferent choice attitudes, modeled across maximally determinate plans of action, as a basis for interpreting deontic claims – about what ought, ought not, and may be done – as expressing a mode of relation between mind and world that gives voice to the exercise of practical rationality. At the same time, I use maximally determinate possible worlds to model descriptive claims in order to understand them as involving a mode of relation between mind and world that manifests our theoretical rationality. The result is of interest to both linguists looking for a formal treatment of deontic modality that captures the role prescriptive mental states play in our lives, and philosophers interested in substantive questions about action-guiding and representational mental states as exercises of practical and theoretical rationality.

Druh

J_SC - Článek v periodiku v databázi SCOPUS

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GX20-05180X" target="_blank" >GX20-05180X: Naturalizovaný inferencializmus: normy, významy a důvody ve světě přírody</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2022

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly

ISSN

0279-0750

e-ISSN

1468-0114

Svazek periodika

103

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

1

Stát vydavatele periodika

US - Spojené státy americké

Počet stran výsledku

30

Strana od-do

156-185

Kód UT WoS článku

000690873800001

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85113721777