On the Natural Ground of Discursive Cognition: Building a Heterodox Explanatory Bridge Between Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F62690094%3A18460%2F22%3A50019438" target="_blank" >RIV/62690094:18460/22:50019438 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://www.pdcnet.org/philtopics/content/philtopics_2022_0050_0001_0109_0134" target="_blank" >https://www.pdcnet.org/philtopics/content/philtopics_2022_0050_0001_0109_0134</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philtopics20225016" target="_blank" >10.5840/philtopics20225016</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

On the Natural Ground of Discursive Cognition: Building a Heterodox Explanatory Bridge Between Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Despite increasing interest in shared intentionality in both philosophy and the sciences over the last three decades, there has been little comparison of philosophical with empirical accounts of the phenomenon. At the same time, both philosophical and scientific investigations into shared intentionality as a ground of our cognition have developed into widespread research programs during this period. This has laid the groundwork for a productive conversation, across the sciences and humanities, about the nature of human cognition qua discursive or rational. In this essay, I map some of the conceptual terrain such a conversation would cover, and I consider some of the extant efforts to build explanatory bridges across research and conversational contexts—using the resources of one domain of understanding to help structure our understanding of another—to the benefit of both philosophical and scientific approaches to the study of human cognition.

Název v anglickém jazyce

On the Natural Ground of Discursive Cognition: Building a Heterodox Explanatory Bridge Between Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences

Popis výsledku anglicky

Despite increasing interest in shared intentionality in both philosophy and the sciences over the last three decades, there has been little comparison of philosophical with empirical accounts of the phenomenon. At the same time, both philosophical and scientific investigations into shared intentionality as a ground of our cognition have developed into widespread research programs during this period. This has laid the groundwork for a productive conversation, across the sciences and humanities, about the nature of human cognition qua discursive or rational. In this essay, I map some of the conceptual terrain such a conversation would cover, and I consider some of the extant efforts to build explanatory bridges across research and conversational contexts—using the resources of one domain of understanding to help structure our understanding of another—to the benefit of both philosophical and scientific approaches to the study of human cognition.

Druh

J_SC - Článek v periodiku v databázi SCOPUS

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GX20-05180X" target="_blank" >GX20-05180X: Naturalizovaný inferencializmus: normy, významy a důvody ve světě přírody</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2022

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Philosophical topics

ISSN

0276-2080

e-ISSN

2154-154X

Svazek periodika

50

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

1

Stát vydavatele periodika

US - Spojené státy americké

Počet stran výsledku

26

Strana od-do

109-134

Kód UT WoS článku

—

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85156150605