Cultural intelligence, shared intentionality and human cognitive uniquenes

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F62690094%3A18460%2F24%3A50021713" target="_blank" >RIV/62690094:18460/24:50021713 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10539-024-09966-w" target="_blank" >https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10539-024-09966-w</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10539-024-09966-w" target="_blank" >10.1007/s10539-024-09966-w</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Cultural intelligence, shared intentionality and human cognitive uniquenes

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

This study critically reflects and assesses a recent debate over the nature of uniquely human cognition. The two standpoints in this debate are advocated by Michael Tomasello and Henrike Moll. Both agree that shared intentionality is a key differencemaker, affording qualitatively new mental processes that support new forms of cooperative sociality and cumulative culture and thoroughly transform human cognition. But Moll argues that Tomasello is infirm in his commitment to the transformativempact of shared intentionality on human cognition, flirting with a conflicting, additive account of shared intentionality as¨making a key difference only in the social domain. On her own view, human-unique social development innervated by humanunique forms of shared intentionality makes a difference across the board, and all the way down. This, we are told, is a reasonnot only to reject additive accounts, but to accept cognitive discontinuity across the board. Having reconstructed the two standpoints, I argue that Tomasello develops a consistently transformative approach immune to most objections leveled by Moll and in key respects more modest and plausible than her own alternative proposal. And I draw from this debate some general methodological lessons for theorizing about the nature and scope of human-unique cognition.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Cultural intelligence, shared intentionality and human cognitive uniquenes

Popis výsledku anglicky

This study critically reflects and assesses a recent debate over the nature of uniquely human cognition. The two standpoints in this debate are advocated by Michael Tomasello and Henrike Moll. Both agree that shared intentionality is a key differencemaker, affording qualitatively new mental processes that support new forms of cooperative sociality and cumulative culture and thoroughly transform human cognition. But Moll argues that Tomasello is infirm in his commitment to the transformativempact of shared intentionality on human cognition, flirting with a conflicting, additive account of shared intentionality as¨making a key difference only in the social domain. On her own view, human-unique social development innervated by humanunique forms of shared intentionality makes a difference across the board, and all the way down. This, we are told, is a reasonnot only to reject additive accounts, but to accept cognitive discontinuity across the board. Having reconstructed the two standpoints, I argue that Tomasello develops a consistently transformative approach immune to most objections leveled by Moll and in key respects more modest and plausible than her own alternative proposal. And I draw from this debate some general methodological lessons for theorizing about the nature and scope of human-unique cognition.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2024

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Biology and Philosophy

ISSN

0169-3867

e-ISSN

1572-8404

Svazek periodika

39

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

5

Stát vydavatele periodika

NL - Nizozemsko

Počet stran výsledku

22

Strana od-do

"Article number: 30"

Kód UT WoS článku

001321717400001

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85204893704