Joint intentionality: from thin to thick

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985955%3A_____%2F16%3A00462532" target="_blank" >RIV/67985955:_____/16:00462532 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/jso-2015-0047" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/jso-2015-0047</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/jso-2015-0047" target="_blank" >10.1515/jso-2015-0047</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Joint intentionality: from thin to thick

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

According to the shared intentionality hypothesis proposed by Michael Tomasello, two cognitive upgrades – joint and collective intentionality, respectively – make human thinking unique. Joint intentionality, in particular, is a mindset supposed to account for our early, species-specific capacity to participate in collaborative activities involving two (or a few) agents. In order to elucidate such activities and their proximate cognitive-motivational mechanism, Tomasello draws on philosophical accounts of shared intentionality. I argue that his deference to such cognitively demanding accounts of shared intentional activities is problematic if his theoretical ambition is in part to show that and how early (prelinguistic and precultural) capacities for joint action contribute to the development of higher cognitive capacities.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Joint intentionality: from thin to thick

Popis výsledku anglicky

According to the shared intentionality hypothesis proposed by Michael Tomasello, two cognitive upgrades – joint and collective intentionality, respectively – make human thinking unique. Joint intentionality, in particular, is a mindset supposed to account for our early, species-specific capacity to participate in collaborative activities involving two (or a few) agents. In order to elucidate such activities and their proximate cognitive-motivational mechanism, Tomasello draws on philosophical accounts of shared intentionality. I argue that his deference to such cognitively demanding accounts of shared intentional activities is problematic if his theoretical ambition is in part to show that and how early (prelinguistic and precultural) capacities for joint action contribute to the development of higher cognitive capacities.

Druh

J_x - Nezařazeno - Článek v odborném periodiku (Jimp, Jsc a Jost)

CEP obor

AA - Filosofie a náboženství

OECD FORD obor

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Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GA13-20785S" target="_blank" >GA13-20785S: Povaha normativity – ontologie, sémantika, logika</a><br>

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2016

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Journal of Social Ontology

ISSN

2196-9655

e-ISSN

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Svazek periodika

2

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

1

Stát vydavatele periodika

DE - Spolková republika Německo

Počet stran výsledku

11

Strana od-do

75-85

Kód UT WoS článku

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EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

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