Deep Disagreement and Naturalized Ethics

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F62690094%3A18460%2F22%3A50020071" target="_blank" >RIV/62690094:18460/22:50020071 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="http://www.filozofia.sav.sk/sk/view/details/regular/2022/10/4422" target="_blank" >http://www.filozofia.sav.sk/sk/view/details/regular/2022/10/4422</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.31577/filozofia.2022.77.10.2" target="_blank" >10.31577/filozofia.2022.77.10.2</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Deep Disagreement and Naturalized Ethics

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Disagreement over moral issues is not uncommon and usually is not considered an obstacle in the search for the right solutions. Differences among individuals’ moral beliefs can be explained by the application of different non-moral facts, i.e., by different epistemology. Some ethicists believe that such a problem is not for ethics to solve. This paper aims to show that this conviction is mistaken, as moral and epistemological aspects present two sides of the same coin. Although on the moral level, one might be optimistic and hope for finding an agreement with peers based on relevant argumentation, on the epistemological level, such optimism is impossible. The main reason is deep disagreement, which occurs sooner or later when solving controversial moral dilemmas. The paper tries to explain how certain types of deep disagreement might be normatively solved within the framework of naturalized ethics.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Deep Disagreement and Naturalized Ethics

Popis výsledku anglicky

Disagreement over moral issues is not uncommon and usually is not considered an obstacle in the search for the right solutions. Differences among individuals’ moral beliefs can be explained by the application of different non-moral facts, i.e., by different epistemology. Some ethicists believe that such a problem is not for ethics to solve. This paper aims to show that this conviction is mistaken, as moral and epistemological aspects present two sides of the same coin. Although on the moral level, one might be optimistic and hope for finding an agreement with peers based on relevant argumentation, on the epistemological level, such optimism is impossible. The main reason is deep disagreement, which occurs sooner or later when solving controversial moral dilemmas. The paper tries to explain how certain types of deep disagreement might be normatively solved within the framework of naturalized ethics.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

60302 - Ethics (except ethics related to specific subfields)

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2022

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Filozofia

ISSN

0046-385X

e-ISSN

2585-7061

Svazek periodika

77

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

10

Stát vydavatele periodika

SK - Slovenská republika

Počet stran výsledku

14

Strana od-do

756-769

Kód UT WoS článku

000905334500003

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85149020928