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Does Deep Moral Disagreement Exist in Real Life?

Identifikátory výsledku

  • Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

    <a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F00216275%3A25210%2F23%3A39920284" target="_blank" >RIV/00216275:25210/23:39920284 - isvavai.cz</a>

  • Výsledek na webu

    <a href="https://www.organonf.com/journal/orgf-2023-30302/" target="_blank" >https://www.organonf.com/journal/orgf-2023-30302/</a>

  • DOI - Digital Object Identifier

    <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2023.30302" target="_blank" >10.31577/orgf.2023.30302</a>

Alternativní jazyky

  • Jazyk výsledku

    angličtina

  • Název v původním jazyce

    Does Deep Moral Disagreement Exist in Real Life?

  • Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

    The existence of deep moral disagreement is used in support of views ranging from moral relativ-ism to the impossibility of moral expertise. This is done despite the fact that it is not at all clear whether deep moral disagreements actually occur, as the usually given examples are never of real life situations, but of some generalized debates on controversial issues. The paper will try to reme-dy this, as any strength of arguments appealing to deep moral disagreement is partly depended on the fact the disagreement exists. This will be done by showing that some real life conflicts that are intractable, i.e. notoriously difficult to resolve, share some important features with deep moral disagreement. The article also deals with the objection that the mere conceptual possibility renders illustrations of actually happening deep moral disagreements unnecessary. The problem with such objection is that it depends on theoretical assumptions (i.e. denial of moral realism) that are not uncontroversial. Instead, the article claims we need not only suppose deep moral disagreements exist because they actually occur when some intractable conflicts occur. Thus, in so far as to the deep moral disagreement’s existence, the arguments appealing to it are safe. But as intractable conflicts can be resolved, by seeing deep moral disagreements as constitutive part of them, we might have to consider whether deep moral disagreements are resolvable too. A brief suggestion of how that might look like is given in the end of the paper.

  • Název v anglickém jazyce

    Does Deep Moral Disagreement Exist in Real Life?

  • Popis výsledku anglicky

    The existence of deep moral disagreement is used in support of views ranging from moral relativ-ism to the impossibility of moral expertise. This is done despite the fact that it is not at all clear whether deep moral disagreements actually occur, as the usually given examples are never of real life situations, but of some generalized debates on controversial issues. The paper will try to reme-dy this, as any strength of arguments appealing to deep moral disagreement is partly depended on the fact the disagreement exists. This will be done by showing that some real life conflicts that are intractable, i.e. notoriously difficult to resolve, share some important features with deep moral disagreement. The article also deals with the objection that the mere conceptual possibility renders illustrations of actually happening deep moral disagreements unnecessary. The problem with such objection is that it depends on theoretical assumptions (i.e. denial of moral realism) that are not uncontroversial. Instead, the article claims we need not only suppose deep moral disagreements exist because they actually occur when some intractable conflicts occur. Thus, in so far as to the deep moral disagreement’s existence, the arguments appealing to it are safe. But as intractable conflicts can be resolved, by seeing deep moral disagreements as constitutive part of them, we might have to consider whether deep moral disagreements are resolvable too. A brief suggestion of how that might look like is given in the end of the paper.

Klasifikace

  • Druh

    J<sub>SC</sub> - Článek v periodiku v databázi SCOPUS

  • CEP obor

  • OECD FORD obor

    60302 - Ethics (except ethics related to specific subfields)

Návaznosti výsledku

  • Projekt

  • Návaznosti

    S - Specificky vyzkum na vysokych skolach

Ostatní

  • Rok uplatnění

    2023

  • Kód důvěrnosti údajů

    S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Údaje specifické pro druh výsledku

  • Název periodika

    Organon F

  • ISSN

    1335-0668

  • e-ISSN

    2585-7150

  • Svazek periodika

    30

  • Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

    3

  • Stát vydavatele periodika

    SK - Slovenská republika

  • Počet stran výsledku

    24

  • Strana od-do

    "255–277"

  • Kód UT WoS článku

  • EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

    2-s2.0-85176765574