The Democratic Cost of Consecutive Re-election and Presidential Term-Limit Evasion in Latin America

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F62690094%3A18460%2F23%3A50018654" target="_blank" >RIV/62690094:18460/23:50018654 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2021.51" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2021.51</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/gov.2021.51" target="_blank" >10.1017/gov.2021.51</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

The Democratic Cost of Consecutive Re-election and Presidential Term-Limit Evasion in Latin America

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Despite theoretical arguments suggesting the strong effects of presidential term limits and re-election on democracy, there is surprisingly little empirical evidence to evaluate them. We test both the effect on democracy of the existence of a consecutive re-election rule and of reforms introducing it for incumbent presidents. Using evidence from Latin American countries between 1945 and 2018, we test their relationship to both vertical and horizontal accountability. A synthetic control method is employed to account for the effect of term-limit reforms, and time-series cross-section models for modelling the association with the re-election rule. Both vertical and horizontal accountability as well as the quality of democracy are eroded by term-limit evasion reforms in most countries and strengthened in none between 1990 and 2018. Allowing presidents to run for re-election – relative to term-limited ones – is consistently associated with weak democratic outcomes.

Název v anglickém jazyce

The Democratic Cost of Consecutive Re-election and Presidential Term-Limit Evasion in Latin America

Popis výsledku anglicky

Despite theoretical arguments suggesting the strong effects of presidential term limits and re-election on democracy, there is surprisingly little empirical evidence to evaluate them. We test both the effect on democracy of the existence of a consecutive re-election rule and of reforms introducing it for incumbent presidents. Using evidence from Latin American countries between 1945 and 2018, we test their relationship to both vertical and horizontal accountability. A synthetic control method is employed to account for the effect of term-limit reforms, and time-series cross-section models for modelling the association with the re-election rule. Both vertical and horizontal accountability as well as the quality of democracy are eroded by term-limit evasion reforms in most countries and strengthened in none between 1990 and 2018. Allowing presidents to run for re-election – relative to term-limited ones – is consistently associated with weak democratic outcomes.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

50601 - Political science

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2023

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Government and Opposition

ISSN

0017-257X

e-ISSN

1477-7053

Svazek periodika

58

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

2

Stát vydavatele periodika

GB - Spojené království Velké Británie a Severního Irska

Počet stran výsledku

31

Strana od-do

360-390

Kód UT WoS článku

000734881100001

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85120619588