Communication Without Shared Meanings

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F62690094%3A18460%2F25%3A50021662" target="_blank" >RIV/62690094:18460/25:50021662 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-024-00604-4" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-024-00604-4</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12136-024-00604-4" target="_blank" >10.1007/s12136-024-00604-4</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Communication Without Shared Meanings

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

According to the objection raised by Fodor and Lepore, inferentialism is untenable because it cannot provide a distinction between meaning-constitutive and ‘utterly contingent’ inferences. As they argue, without the distinction, the meanings of expressions cannot be shared and, without the shared meanings, the successfulness of communication cannot be explained. In other words, without the distinction, inferentialism becomes committed to holism. The aim of this paper is to show that if we understand communication in terms of the coordination of actions, then partial sharing of meanings, i.e. sharing of contextually relevant aspects of meanings, is a sufficient requirement for communication to be successful. As I argue, if we accept such a view of communication, then inferentialism can explain the successfulness of communication without relying on the notion of shared meanings and so it can navigate the muddy waters of holism. © Springer Nature B.V. 2024.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Communication Without Shared Meanings

Popis výsledku anglicky

According to the objection raised by Fodor and Lepore, inferentialism is untenable because it cannot provide a distinction between meaning-constitutive and ‘utterly contingent’ inferences. As they argue, without the distinction, the meanings of expressions cannot be shared and, without the shared meanings, the successfulness of communication cannot be explained. In other words, without the distinction, inferentialism becomes committed to holism. The aim of this paper is to show that if we understand communication in terms of the coordination of actions, then partial sharing of meanings, i.e. sharing of contextually relevant aspects of meanings, is a sufficient requirement for communication to be successful. As I argue, if we accept such a view of communication, then inferentialism can explain the successfulness of communication without relying on the notion of shared meanings and so it can navigate the muddy waters of holism. © Springer Nature B.V. 2024.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GX20-05180X" target="_blank" >GX20-05180X: Naturalizovaný inferencializmus: normy, významy a důvody ve světě přírody</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2025

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Acta Analytica

ISSN

0353-5150

e-ISSN

1874-6349

Svazek periodika

40

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

2

Stát vydavatele periodika

NL - Nizozemsko

Počet stran výsledku

18

Strana od-do

311-328

Kód UT WoS článku

001282055000001

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85200133252