DEMO: What Lies Beneath Players' Non-Rationality in Ultimatum Game?

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985556%3A_____%2F13%3A00396810" target="_blank" >RIV/67985556:_____/13:00396810 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

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DOI - Digital Object Identifier

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Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

DEMO: What Lies Beneath Players' Non-Rationality in Ultimatum Game?

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

The rational strategy suggested by the game theory predicts a human playing Ultimatum Game (UG) would have tendency to decide in accordance with the assumption of self-interested rationality, i.e. to choose more for oneself and offer the least amount possible for co-players [2]. This ?utilitarian and gametheoretically correct ?rational behaviour is however rarely observed when experiments are conducted with human beings [1]. Long-term research in experimental economics indicates that humans do not behave as selfish as traditional economics assume them to do. In UG, human-responders reject offers they find too low while human-proposers often offer more than the smallest amount. An intuitively plausible interpretation of this phenomenon is that responders would rather give up some profit than be treated unfairly. This ?non-rational behaviour provides an insight into human?s motivation as a social being. The work challenges this view and insists on human rationality.

Název v anglickém jazyce

DEMO: What Lies Beneath Players' Non-Rationality in Ultimatum Game?

Popis výsledku anglicky

The rational strategy suggested by the game theory predicts a human playing Ultimatum Game (UG) would have tendency to decide in accordance with the assumption of self-interested rationality, i.e. to choose more for oneself and offer the least amount possible for co-players [2]. This ?utilitarian and gametheoretically correct ?rational behaviour is however rarely observed when experiments are conducted with human beings [1]. Long-term research in experimental economics indicates that humans do not behave as selfish as traditional economics assume them to do. In UG, human-responders reject offers they find too low while human-proposers often offer more than the smallest amount. An intuitively plausible interpretation of this phenomenon is that responders would rather give up some profit than be treated unfairly. This ?non-rational behaviour provides an insight into human?s motivation as a social being. The work challenges this view and insists on human rationality.

Druh

D - Stať ve sborníku

CEP obor

BC - Teorie a systémy řízení

OECD FORD obor

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Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GA13-13502S" target="_blank" >GA13-13502S: Plně pravděpodobností návrh dynamických rozhodovacích strategií s nedokonalými účastníky v tržních scénářích</a><br>

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2013

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název statě ve sborníku

Preprints of the 3rd International Workshop on Scalable Decision Making held in conjunction with ECML/PKDD 2013

ISBN

978-80-903834-8-7

ISSN

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e-ISSN

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Počet stran výsledku

1

Strana od-do

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Název nakladatele

Institute of Information Theory and Automation

Místo vydání

Prague

Místo konání akce

Prague

Datum konání akce

23. 9. 2013

Typ akce podle státní příslušnosti

WRD - Celosvětová akce

Kód UT WoS článku

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