The Nature and Diversity of Rules

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985955%3A_____%2F18%3A00489503" target="_blank" >RIV/67985955:_____/18:00489503 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315103587" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315103587</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315103587" target="_blank" >10.4324/9781315103587</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

The Nature and Diversity of Rules

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

The paper suggests that the terminological/conceptual apparatus employed in debates on rules within the inferentialist environment as well as in other areas of philosophy needs elaboration and clarification. It argues that within the “rule-talk” we should carefully distinguish when we speak about rules (norms) understood as social facts (F-rules) and when we speak about rules understood as abstract linguistic entities (L-rules). We should also be aware of the fact that besides a full-fledged existence which can ascribed to F-rules if a relevant regulative relationship between social subjects has been established, we also need to ascribe another kind of “existence” (validity) to rules. This kind of relative “existence” can be ascribed to L-rules which jointly form a normative space. Such space can be inhabited by agents. (The uninhabited exist only in a standby mode - as a SB-system). In its last part, the paper tries to provide a firmer grasp on the often made but rarely examined distinction between explicit and implicit rules.

Název v anglickém jazyce

The Nature and Diversity of Rules

Popis výsledku anglicky

The paper suggests that the terminological/conceptual apparatus employed in debates on rules within the inferentialist environment as well as in other areas of philosophy needs elaboration and clarification. It argues that within the “rule-talk” we should carefully distinguish when we speak about rules (norms) understood as social facts (F-rules) and when we speak about rules understood as abstract linguistic entities (L-rules). We should also be aware of the fact that besides a full-fledged existence which can ascribed to F-rules if a relevant regulative relationship between social subjects has been established, we also need to ascribe another kind of “existence” (validity) to rules. This kind of relative “existence” can be ascribed to L-rules which jointly form a normative space. Such space can be inhabited by agents. (The uninhabited exist only in a standby mode - as a SB-system). In its last part, the paper tries to provide a firmer grasp on the often made but rarely examined distinction between explicit and implicit rules.

Druh

C - Kapitola v odborné knize

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GA13-20785S" target="_blank" >GA13-20785S: Povaha normativity – ontologie, sémantika, logika</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)

Rok uplatnění

2018

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název knihy nebo sborníku

From Rules to Meanings. New Essays on Inferentialism

ISBN

978-1-138-10261-3

Počet stran výsledku

17

Strana od-do

261-277

Počet stran knihy

357

Název nakladatele

Routledge

Místo vydání

New York

Kód UT WoS kapitoly

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