Begriffsschrift's Logic

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985955%3A_____%2F20%3A00535046" target="_blank" >RIV/67985955:_____/20:00535046 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://doi.org/10.1215/00294527-2020-0014" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.1215/00294527-2020-0014</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00294527-2020-0014" target="_blank" >10.1215/00294527-2020-0014</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Begriffsschrift's Logic

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

In Begriffsschrift, Frege presented a formal system and used it to formulate logical definitions of arithmetical notions and to deduce some noteworthy theorems by means of logical axioms and inference rules. From a contemporary perspective, Begriffsschrift’s deductions are, in general, straightforward, it is assumed that all of them can be reproduced in a second-order formal system. Some deductions in this work present-according to this perspective-oddities that have led many scholars to consider it to be Frege’s inaccuracies which should be amended. In this paper, we continue with the analysis of Begriffsschrift’s logic undertaken in an earlier work and argue that its deductive system must not be reconstructed as a second-order calculus. This leads us to argue that Begriffsschrift’s deductions do not need any correction but, on the contrary, can be explained in coherence with a global reading of this work and, in particular, with its fundamental distinction between function and argument.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Begriffsschrift's Logic

Popis výsledku anglicky

In Begriffsschrift, Frege presented a formal system and used it to formulate logical definitions of arithmetical notions and to deduce some noteworthy theorems by means of logical axioms and inference rules. From a contemporary perspective, Begriffsschrift’s deductions are, in general, straightforward, it is assumed that all of them can be reproduced in a second-order formal system. Some deductions in this work present-according to this perspective-oddities that have led many scholars to consider it to be Frege’s inaccuracies which should be amended. In this paper, we continue with the analysis of Begriffsschrift’s logic undertaken in an earlier work and argue that its deductive system must not be reconstructed as a second-order calculus. This leads us to argue that Begriffsschrift’s deductions do not need any correction but, on the contrary, can be explained in coherence with a global reading of this work and, in particular, with its fundamental distinction between function and argument.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2020

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic

ISSN

0029-4527

e-ISSN

—

Svazek periodika

61

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

3

Stát vydavatele periodika

US - Spojené státy americké

Počet stran výsledku

32

Strana od-do

409-440

Kód UT WoS článku

000580465300004

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85096075772