Function and Argument in Begriffsschrift

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985955%3A_____%2F17%3A00481510" target="_blank" >RIV/67985955:_____/17:00481510 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01445340.2017.1354173" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01445340.2017.1354173</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01445340.2017.1354173" target="_blank" >10.1080/01445340.2017.1354173</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Function and Argument in Begriffsschrift

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

It is well known that the formal system developed by Frege in Begriffsschrift is based upon the distinction between function and argumentas opposed to the traditional distinction between subject and predicate. Almost all of the modern commentaries on Frege's work suggest a semantic interpretation of this distinction, and identify it with the ontological structure of function and object, upon which Grundgesetze is based. Those commentaries agree that the system proposed by Frege in Begriffsschrift has some gaps, but it is taken as an essentially correct formal system for second-order logic: the first one in the history of logic. However, there is strong textual evidence that such an interpretation should be rejected. This evidence shows that the nature of the distinction between function and argument is stated by Frege in a significantly different way: it applies only to expressions and not to entities. The formal system based on this distinction is tremendously flexible and is suitable for making explicit the logical structure of contents as well as of deductive chains. We put forward a new reconstruction of the function-argument scheme and the quantification theory in Begriffsschrift. After that, we discuss the usual semantic interpretation of Begriffsschrift and show its inconsistencies with a rigorous reading of the text.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Function and Argument in Begriffsschrift

Popis výsledku anglicky

It is well known that the formal system developed by Frege in Begriffsschrift is based upon the distinction between function and argumentas opposed to the traditional distinction between subject and predicate. Almost all of the modern commentaries on Frege's work suggest a semantic interpretation of this distinction, and identify it with the ontological structure of function and object, upon which Grundgesetze is based. Those commentaries agree that the system proposed by Frege in Begriffsschrift has some gaps, but it is taken as an essentially correct formal system for second-order logic: the first one in the history of logic. However, there is strong textual evidence that such an interpretation should be rejected. This evidence shows that the nature of the distinction between function and argument is stated by Frege in a significantly different way: it applies only to expressions and not to entities. The formal system based on this distinction is tremendously flexible and is suitable for making explicit the logical structure of contents as well as of deductive chains. We put forward a new reconstruction of the function-argument scheme and the quantification theory in Begriffsschrift. After that, we discuss the usual semantic interpretation of Begriffsschrift and show its inconsistencies with a rigorous reading of the text.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2017

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

History and Philosophy of Logic

ISSN

0144-5340

e-ISSN

—

Svazek periodika

38

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

4

Stát vydavatele periodika

GB - Spojené království Velké Británie a Severního Irska

Počet stran výsledku

26

Strana od-do

316-341

Kód UT WoS článku

000413765300002

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85026767695