Frege’s adoption of the distinction between concept and object

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

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Výsledek na webu

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DOI - Digital Object Identifier

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Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Frege’s adoption of the distinction between concept and object

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

I discuss Frege’s philosophical transit from Begriffsschrift to Grundlagen. I focus on the replacement of function-argument scheme with the concept-object scheme, which has received virtually no attention in historical studies. Begriffsschrift’s reception and Frege’s response to criticisms are taken in [Heck, May, 2013] as the main reason for Frege’s adoption of the concept-object scheme. I claim that there are two additional causes of Frege’s move. First, in the context of the deployment of the logicist project, Frege noticed the limitations of Begriffsschrift’s formal system and the need to establish an ontological foundation – based on the concept-object scheme – that allowed him to provide a definition of natural number. Second, the function-argument scheme provided an inadequate analysis of atomic statements. I defend that the concept-object scheme should not be seen as an extension of the function-argument scheme. What is essential to the notion of concept is its unsaturatedness, which is never attributed to Begriffsschrift’s notion of function. From this stance I argue that two features show the virtues of the concept-object scheme: first, Frege’s notion of concept sets a foundation for the principle of the priority of judgements over concepts, second, the concept-object scheme allows an adequate semantical analysis of categorical statements.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Frege’s adoption of the distinction between concept and object

Popis výsledku anglicky

I discuss Frege’s philosophical transit from Begriffsschrift to Grundlagen. I focus on the replacement of function-argument scheme with the concept-object scheme, which has received virtually no attention in historical studies. Begriffsschrift’s reception and Frege’s response to criticisms are taken in [Heck, May, 2013] as the main reason for Frege’s adoption of the concept-object scheme. I claim that there are two additional causes of Frege’s move. First, in the context of the deployment of the logicist project, Frege noticed the limitations of Begriffsschrift’s formal system and the need to establish an ontological foundation – based on the concept-object scheme – that allowed him to provide a definition of natural number. Second, the function-argument scheme provided an inadequate analysis of atomic statements. I defend that the concept-object scheme should not be seen as an extension of the function-argument scheme. What is essential to the notion of concept is its unsaturatedness, which is never attributed to Begriffsschrift’s notion of function. From this stance I argue that two features show the virtues of the concept-object scheme: first, Frege’s notion of concept sets a foundation for the principle of the priority of judgements over concepts, second, the concept-object scheme allows an adequate semantical analysis of categorical statements.

Druh

D - Stať ve sborníku

CEP obor

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OECD FORD obor

60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology

Projekt

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Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2018

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název statě ve sborníku

Actas del IX Congreso de la Sociedad de Lógica, Metodología y Filosofía de la Ciencia en España

ISBN

978-84-09-06054-2

ISSN

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e-ISSN

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Počet stran výsledku

3

Strana od-do

16-18

Název nakladatele

UNED

Místo vydání

Madrid

Místo konání akce

Madrid

Datum konání akce

13. 10. 2018

Typ akce podle státní příslušnosti

WRD - Celosvětová akce

Kód UT WoS článku

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