Five views of definienda in Alexander’s Quaestiones 1.3 and 2.14

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985955%3A_____%2F21%3A00547704" target="_blank" >RIV/67985955:_____/21:00547704 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://doi.org/10.1515/elen-2021-0018" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.1515/elen-2021-0018</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/elen-2021-0018" target="_blank" >10.1515/elen-2021-0018</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Five views of definienda in Alexander’s Quaestiones 1.3 and 2.14

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

In Quaestiones 1.3 and 2.14, Alexander presents a distinctly realist or essentialist view of the objects of definition, distinguished, on the one hand, from two types of realism rejected by Aristotle (definienda as separate forms and as particulars), and, on the other, from two types of conceptualism (non-essentialist and essentialist abstractivism) that probably belong within the Peripatetic tradition. The difference between Alexander’s view and essentialist abstractivism lies in his understanding of definienda not as the common concepts of things existing in the particulars, but as the common things conceived of as existing in the particulars. This paper offers a close reading of Quaest. 1.3, whose aim is to flesh out Alexander’s position vis-à-vis the objects of definition against the backdrop of the four rejected alternatives. The distinction between Alexander’s essentialism and the essentialist abstractivist notion of definienda is further explained in light of Quaest. 2.14. The amended Greek text of Quaest. 1.3 is appended with an English translation.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Five views of definienda in Alexander’s Quaestiones 1.3 and 2.14

Popis výsledku anglicky

In Quaestiones 1.3 and 2.14, Alexander presents a distinctly realist or essentialist view of the objects of definition, distinguished, on the one hand, from two types of realism rejected by Aristotle (definienda as separate forms and as particulars), and, on the other, from two types of conceptualism (non-essentialist and essentialist abstractivism) that probably belong within the Peripatetic tradition. The difference between Alexander’s view and essentialist abstractivism lies in his understanding of definienda not as the common concepts of things existing in the particulars, but as the common things conceived of as existing in the particulars. This paper offers a close reading of Quaest. 1.3, whose aim is to flesh out Alexander’s position vis-à-vis the objects of definition against the backdrop of the four rejected alternatives. The distinction between Alexander’s essentialism and the essentialist abstractivist notion of definienda is further explained in light of Quaest. 2.14. The amended Greek text of Quaest. 1.3 is appended with an English translation.

Druh

J_SC - Článek v periodiku v databázi SCOPUS

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GA20-16937S" target="_blank" >GA20-16937S: Aristotelský důkaz v teorii a praxi Galénovy lékařské vědy</a><br>

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2021

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Elenchos

ISSN

0392-7342

e-ISSN

—

Svazek periodika

42

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

2

Stát vydavatele periodika

IT - Italská republika

Počet stran výsledku

24

Strana od-do

351-374

Kód UT WoS článku

—

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85122695756