Moderate anti-exceptionalism and earthborn logic
Identifikátory výsledku
Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI
<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985955%3A_____%2F21%3A00551757" target="_blank" >RIV/67985955:_____/21:00551757 - isvavai.cz</a>
Výsledek na webu
<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03182-9" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03182-9</a>
DOI - Digital Object Identifier
<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03182-9" target="_blank" >10.1007/s11229-021-03182-9</a>
Alternativní jazyky
Jazyk výsledku
angličtina
Název v původním jazyce
Moderate anti-exceptionalism and earthborn logic
Popis výsledku v původním jazyce
In this paper we put forward and defend a view of the nature of logic that we call moderate anti-exceptionalism. In the first part of the paper we focus on the problem of genuine logical validity and consequence. We make use of examples from current debates to show that attempts to pinpoint the one and only authentic logic inevitably either yield irrefutable (and hence methodologically idle) theories or lead to dead ends. We then outline a thoroughly naturalist account of logical consequence as grounded in rules implicit in human linguistic practices (and thus immune to Quinean criticism of basing logic on explicit conventions). We insist that there are only two existing kinds of language: natural languages, and artificial languages that have been forged by us. There is thus no room for a “genuine” language (independent of us) and hence for “genuine” logic. We conclude that though logical theories are established - and are liable to criticism - in a similar fashion as those of the sciences, and in this sense logic is not exceptional, to fulfill its mission logic must lay a claim to normative authority over our argumentation and reasoning, which makes its methodology somewhat special. Logical theory is not meant to provide just an explanation, the standards it establishes serve also as a tool, providing for a reinforcement of our rational communication.
Název v anglickém jazyce
Moderate anti-exceptionalism and earthborn logic
Popis výsledku anglicky
In this paper we put forward and defend a view of the nature of logic that we call moderate anti-exceptionalism. In the first part of the paper we focus on the problem of genuine logical validity and consequence. We make use of examples from current debates to show that attempts to pinpoint the one and only authentic logic inevitably either yield irrefutable (and hence methodologically idle) theories or lead to dead ends. We then outline a thoroughly naturalist account of logical consequence as grounded in rules implicit in human linguistic practices (and thus immune to Quinean criticism of basing logic on explicit conventions). We insist that there are only two existing kinds of language: natural languages, and artificial languages that have been forged by us. There is thus no room for a “genuine” language (independent of us) and hence for “genuine” logic. We conclude that though logical theories are established - and are liable to criticism - in a similar fashion as those of the sciences, and in this sense logic is not exceptional, to fulfill its mission logic must lay a claim to normative authority over our argumentation and reasoning, which makes its methodology somewhat special. Logical theory is not meant to provide just an explanation, the standards it establishes serve also as a tool, providing for a reinforcement of our rational communication.
Klasifikace
Druh
J<sub>imp</sub> - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science
CEP obor
—
OECD FORD obor
60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology
Návaznosti výsledku
Projekt
<a href="/cs/project/GA20-18675S" target="_blank" >GA20-18675S: Povaha logických forem a moderní logika</a><br>
Návaznosti
I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace
Ostatní
Rok uplatnění
2021
Kód důvěrnosti údajů
S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů
Údaje specifické pro druh výsledku
Název periodika
Synthese
ISSN
0039-7857
e-ISSN
1573-0964
Svazek periodika
199
Číslo periodika v rámci svazku
3/4
Stát vydavatele periodika
NL - Nizozemsko
Počet stran výsledku
26
Strana od-do
8781-8806
Kód UT WoS článku
000658619000001
EID výsledku v databázi Scopus
2-s2.0-85107633787