Inner Awareness as a Mark of the Mental

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985955%3A_____%2F22%3A00561785" target="_blank" >RIV/67985955:_____/22:00561785 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://doi.org/10.17454/pam-2204" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.17454/pam-2204</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.17454/pam-2204" target="_blank" >10.17454/pam-2204</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Inner Awareness as a Mark of the Mental

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

While for Brentano it is a mark of the mental that any mental state is an object of inner awareness, this suggestion is notably rejected by the Higher-Order Thought Theory (HOTT) of consciousness that posits non-conscious inner awareness, which isn’t an object of inner awareness, and yet is mental. I examine an objection against the HOTT, according to which inner awareness is phenomenally present in ordinary consciousness. To assess the objection, I investigate arguments of Chalmers and Montague in favor of this phenomenal presence. I argue that while these arguments may show that experience is not transparent, they crucially fail to demonstrate that ‘inner transparency’ must be false too, i.e. that inner awareness is phenomenally present. I conclude that non-conscious inner awareness is an open possibility and Brentano’s posit of inner awareness as a mark of the mental thus looks unpromising.n

Název v anglickém jazyce

Inner Awareness as a Mark of the Mental

Popis výsledku anglicky

While for Brentano it is a mark of the mental that any mental state is an object of inner awareness, this suggestion is notably rejected by the Higher-Order Thought Theory (HOTT) of consciousness that posits non-conscious inner awareness, which isn’t an object of inner awareness, and yet is mental. I examine an objection against the HOTT, according to which inner awareness is phenomenally present in ordinary consciousness. To assess the objection, I investigate arguments of Chalmers and Montague in favor of this phenomenal presence. I argue that while these arguments may show that experience is not transparent, they crucially fail to demonstrate that ‘inner transparency’ must be false too, i.e. that inner awareness is phenomenally present. I conclude that non-conscious inner awareness is an open possibility and Brentano’s posit of inner awareness as a mark of the mental thus looks unpromising.n

Druh

J_SC - Článek v periodiku v databázi SCOPUS

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/EF19_074%2F0014159" target="_blank" >EF19_074/0014159: Vědomí ve hmotném světě</a><br>

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2022

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Phenomenology and Mind

ISSN

2280-7853

e-ISSN

2239-4028

Svazek periodika

—

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

22

Stát vydavatele periodika

IT - Italská republika

Počet stran výsledku

13

Strana od-do

54-66

Kód UT WoS článku

—

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85137892554