Troubles with the orthogonality thesis

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985955%3A_____%2F24%3A00600048" target="_blank" >RIV/67985955:_____/24:00600048 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003409526-13" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003409526-13</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003409526-13" target="_blank" >10.4324/9781003409526-13</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Troubles with the orthogonality thesis

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

This chapter evaluates some basic assumptions behind the ‘dual’ theories of phenomenal consciousness and finds them problematic for at least some examples of conscious episodes. Because the dual theories claim to be universalist in nature, even a small number of counterexamples damages their status. I will present evidence, both empirical and conceptual, that demonstrates the untenability of the dualist assumptions that conscious phenomenality and its unconscious counterpart possess essentially the same qualities. In doing so, I will primarily attack the claim that is shared by many dual theorists that the procedure responsible for bringing phenomenal content into consciousness serves this sole function and does not influence phenomenal qualities of content. I use the term orthogonality as a convenient shortcut for the conception in which consciousness and content come unproblematically apart. I will conclude by hinting at an alternative proposal that explains the emergence of conscious phenomenality as a single step operation.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Troubles with the orthogonality thesis

Popis výsledku anglicky

This chapter evaluates some basic assumptions behind the ‘dual’ theories of phenomenal consciousness and finds them problematic for at least some examples of conscious episodes. Because the dual theories claim to be universalist in nature, even a small number of counterexamples damages their status. I will present evidence, both empirical and conceptual, that demonstrates the untenability of the dualist assumptions that conscious phenomenality and its unconscious counterpart possess essentially the same qualities. In doing so, I will primarily attack the claim that is shared by many dual theorists that the procedure responsible for bringing phenomenal content into consciousness serves this sole function and does not influence phenomenal qualities of content. I use the term orthogonality as a convenient shortcut for the conception in which consciousness and content come unproblematically apart. I will conclude by hinting at an alternative proposal that explains the emergence of conscious phenomenality as a single step operation.

Druh

C - Kapitola v odborné knize

CEP obor

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OECD FORD obor

60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GA20-14445S" target="_blank" >GA20-14445S: Duální modely fenomenálního vědomí</a><br>

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2024

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název knihy nebo sborníku

Conscious and Unconscious Mentality. Examining their Nature, Similarities, and Differences

ISBN

978-1-032-52979-0

Počet stran výsledku

11

Strana od-do

174-184

Počet stran knihy

332

Název nakladatele

Routledge

Místo vydání

London

Kód UT WoS kapitoly

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