Hurtado de Mendoza on the “Moral” Modality. Part 2. Hurtado’s 1630s writings

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985955%3A_____%2F22%3A00568940" target="_blank" >RIV/67985955:_____/22:00568940 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://doi.org/10.5840/studneoar20221912" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.5840/studneoar20221912</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/studneoar20221912" target="_blank" >10.5840/studneoar20221912</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Hurtado de Mendoza on the “Moral” Modality. Part 2. Hurtado’s 1630s writings

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Puente Hurtado de Mendoza (1578– 1641), Iberian Jesuit and author of one of the earliest comprehensive Baroque philosophy courses, entered the debate on the modality “moral” or “morally” in the sense of a qualifier of evidence, certainty, being, and necessity or impossibility in the first half of the seventeenth century. This paper presents his analysis of the different forms (or levels) of evidence and necessity or impossibility in 1630s, where “moral” represents the weakest degree of these properties. First, it covers the notion of moral evidence in the sense of a wise decision that is in accordance with the consensus of either the majority of mankind or of the learned community, as introduced in Disputationes de Deo. Second, it covers the notions of moral necessity and impossibility, introduced in De Deo homine in terms of a strong inclination, and developed in Hurtado’s later theological texts. Third, Hurtado introduced the notion “morally” in his De actibus humanis in frequentist terms.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Hurtado de Mendoza on the “Moral” Modality. Part 2. Hurtado’s 1630s writings

Popis výsledku anglicky

Puente Hurtado de Mendoza (1578– 1641), Iberian Jesuit and author of one of the earliest comprehensive Baroque philosophy courses, entered the debate on the modality “moral” or “morally” in the sense of a qualifier of evidence, certainty, being, and necessity or impossibility in the first half of the seventeenth century. This paper presents his analysis of the different forms (or levels) of evidence and necessity or impossibility in 1630s, where “moral” represents the weakest degree of these properties. First, it covers the notion of moral evidence in the sense of a wise decision that is in accordance with the consensus of either the majority of mankind or of the learned community, as introduced in Disputationes de Deo. Second, it covers the notions of moral necessity and impossibility, introduced in De Deo homine in terms of a strong inclination, and developed in Hurtado’s later theological texts. Third, Hurtado introduced the notion “morally” in his De actibus humanis in frequentist terms.

Druh

J_ost - Ostatní články v recenzovaných periodicích

CEP obor

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OECD FORD obor

60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GA17-12408S" target="_blank" >GA17-12408S: Pravděpodobnostní argumentace v pozdně scholastické logice</a><br>

Návaznosti

P - Projekt vyzkumu a vyvoje financovany z verejnych zdroju (s odkazem do CEP)<br>I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2022

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Studia Neoaristotelica

ISSN

1214-8407

e-ISSN

1804-6843

Svazek periodika

19

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

1

Stát vydavatele periodika

US - Spojené státy americké

Počet stran výsledku

29

Strana od-do

107-135

Kód UT WoS článku

000998065200002

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

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