Aristotle’s Notion of Deduction

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985955%3A_____%2F23%3A00587823" target="_blank" >RIV/67985955:_____/23:00587823 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2023-0004" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2023-0004</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/disp-2023-0004" target="_blank" >10.2478/disp-2023-0004</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Aristotle’s Notion of Deduction

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Aristotle’s notion of deduction (syllogism) differs from the conception of logical consequence in classical logic in two essential features, which are required by Aristotle’s definition of syllogism and are incorporated into his formalisation of deduction: in addition to the standard necessary truth-preservation, Aristotle requires relevance of premises for the conclusion and non-repetition of premises in the conclusion. These requirements, together with Aristotle’s conception of simple propositions, lead to the result that valid deductive steps (syllogisms) must have very specific forms, namely the well-known syllogistic shape. All other kinds of deduction lacking this shape, such as “syllogisms based on a hypothesis”, can be considered “syllogisms” only in a relative sense: they are based on an assumption of the existence of genuine syllogistic deductions in the syllogistic shape. Aristotle’s demands should cover all kinds of deduction: all valid deduction must be relevant and non-repetitive. This brings Aristotle’s definition much closer to the intuition associated with the notion of logical consequence.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Aristotle’s Notion of Deduction

Popis výsledku anglicky

Aristotle’s notion of deduction (syllogism) differs from the conception of logical consequence in classical logic in two essential features, which are required by Aristotle’s definition of syllogism and are incorporated into his formalisation of deduction: in addition to the standard necessary truth-preservation, Aristotle requires relevance of premises for the conclusion and non-repetition of premises in the conclusion. These requirements, together with Aristotle’s conception of simple propositions, lead to the result that valid deductive steps (syllogisms) must have very specific forms, namely the well-known syllogistic shape. All other kinds of deduction lacking this shape, such as “syllogisms based on a hypothesis”, can be considered “syllogisms” only in a relative sense: they are based on an assumption of the existence of genuine syllogistic deductions in the syllogistic shape. Aristotle’s demands should cover all kinds of deduction: all valid deduction must be relevant and non-repetitive. This brings Aristotle’s definition much closer to the intuition associated with the notion of logical consequence.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GA23-07119S" target="_blank" >GA23-07119S: VÝZNAM JAKO OBJEKT - PRINCIPY SÉMANTICKÝCH TEORIÍ</a><br>

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2023

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Disputatio. International Journal of Philosophy

ISSN

0873-626X

e-ISSN

2182-2875

Svazek periodika

15

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

68

Stát vydavatele periodika

PT - Portugalská republika

Počet stran výsledku

25

Strana od-do

90-114

Kód UT WoS článku

001263242800005

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-105000470249