Lying as a Language Game? A Game Theory Perspective

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985955%3A_____%2F24%3A00599862" target="_blank" >RIV/67985955:_____/24:00599862 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

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DOI - Digital Object Identifier

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Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Lying as a Language Game? A Game Theory Perspective

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Within game theory, there are important experiments on lying that aim to show the extent to which participants are willing to lie given the costs and benefits of such behavior. However, these investigations have so far only unsystematically reflected the debates about lying in the contemporary philosophy of language and epistemology, in which a variety of definitions of lying are at work. Using the experiment in Fischbacher & Follmi-Heusi (2013) as an example, we demonstrate that the use of contemporary philosophy can be advantageous for game theory in reducing one type of ambiguity in these games: ambiguity about what type of lie is actually considered and applied by the participants. We show that players in the experiment could lie in 17 different ways, all of which are described in James Mahon’s list summarizing definitions of lying in contemporary philosophy (Mahon 2016). It remains ambiguous whether the liars made decisions regarding the identical lying language game and whether they accounted for the same disutility of lying. Future experiments could reduce this ambiguity by including elements in the instructions that make it clearer what type of lie the participant considers or applies.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Lying as a Language Game? A Game Theory Perspective

Popis výsledku anglicky

Within game theory, there are important experiments on lying that aim to show the extent to which participants are willing to lie given the costs and benefits of such behavior. However, these investigations have so far only unsystematically reflected the debates about lying in the contemporary philosophy of language and epistemology, in which a variety of definitions of lying are at work. Using the experiment in Fischbacher & Follmi-Heusi (2013) as an example, we demonstrate that the use of contemporary philosophy can be advantageous for game theory in reducing one type of ambiguity in these games: ambiguity about what type of lie is actually considered and applied by the participants. We show that players in the experiment could lie in 17 different ways, all of which are described in James Mahon’s list summarizing definitions of lying in contemporary philosophy (Mahon 2016). It remains ambiguous whether the liars made decisions regarding the identical lying language game and whether they accounted for the same disutility of lying. Future experiments could reduce this ambiguity by including elements in the instructions that make it clearer what type of lie the participant considers or applies.

Druh

O - Ostatní výsledky

CEP obor

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OECD FORD obor

60301 - Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/EH22_008%2F0004595" target="_blank" >EH22_008/0004595: Za hranice bezpečnosti: role konfliktu v posilování odolnosti</a><br>

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2024

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů