Psychology and Neuroscience. The (New) Autonomy Question

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985955%3A_____%2F25%3A00588329" target="_blank" >RIV/67985955:_____/25:00588329 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-024-00833-4" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-024-00833-4</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10670-024-00833-4" target="_blank" >10.1007/s10670-024-00833-4</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Psychology and Neuroscience. The (New) Autonomy Question

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

The traditional thesis of the autonomy of psychology from neuroscience is grounded in a metaphysical thesis, the irreducibility thesis. Anti-reductionism is still dominant nowadays, and, as a consequence, autonomists arguably stand on firmer grounds. Still, an anti-autonomist might have the intuition that even if psychology is not reducible to neuroscience, there is a sense, not metaphysically grounded, but epistemologically grounded, in which psychology clearly is not autonomous from neuroscience. The challenge is then to offer a concept of autonomy which allows for the articulation of a new and significant autonomy thesis, and to show that the thesis is false. The thesis that psychologists need not consider neuroscientific explanations when putting forward psychological explanations is such a thesis. I take it that both this characterization of autonomy and an antiautonomist argument in this sense can already be found in a paper co-authored by Gualtiero Piccinini and CarlCraver. Piccinini and Craver’s attack on this thesis is grounded on the claim that psychologists should support their functional analyses by means ofmechanistic explanations for the former to be justified at all. I also take it that, as Lawrence Shapiro has shown, their argument ultimately fails. But this was a very valuable attempt, and, in this paper, I intend to build on it with the aim of offering a new and hopefully effective anti-autonomist argument. I contend that psychologists do need to consider neuroscientific explanations when putting forward psychological explanations, and this stems from the fact that they provide the same type of explanations of the same kind of phenomena as neuroscientist, or so I argue.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Psychology and Neuroscience. The (New) Autonomy Question

Popis výsledku anglicky

The traditional thesis of the autonomy of psychology from neuroscience is grounded in a metaphysical thesis, the irreducibility thesis. Anti-reductionism is still dominant nowadays, and, as a consequence, autonomists arguably stand on firmer grounds. Still, an anti-autonomist might have the intuition that even if psychology is not reducible to neuroscience, there is a sense, not metaphysically grounded, but epistemologically grounded, in which psychology clearly is not autonomous from neuroscience. The challenge is then to offer a concept of autonomy which allows for the articulation of a new and significant autonomy thesis, and to show that the thesis is false. The thesis that psychologists need not consider neuroscientific explanations when putting forward psychological explanations is such a thesis. I take it that both this characterization of autonomy and an antiautonomist argument in this sense can already be found in a paper co-authored by Gualtiero Piccinini and CarlCraver. Piccinini and Craver’s attack on this thesis is grounded on the claim that psychologists should support their functional analyses by means ofmechanistic explanations for the former to be justified at all. I also take it that, as Lawrence Shapiro has shown, their argument ultimately fails. But this was a very valuable attempt, and, in this paper, I intend to build on it with the aim of offering a new and hopefully effective anti-autonomist argument. I contend that psychologists do need to consider neuroscientific explanations when putting forward psychological explanations, and this stems from the fact that they provide the same type of explanations of the same kind of phenomena as neuroscientist, or so I argue.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

50101 - Psychology (including human - machine relations)

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GA20-14445S" target="_blank" >GA20-14445S: Duální modely fenomenálního vědomí</a><br>

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2025

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Erkenntnis

ISSN

0165-0106

e-ISSN

1572-8420

Svazek periodika

90

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

7

Stát vydavatele periodika

DE - Spolková republika Německo

Počet stran výsledku

20

Strana od-do

2909-2928

Kód UT WoS článku

001282851300003

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85200155659