Reversibility in dynamic coordination problems

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985998%3A_____%2F13%3A00391313" target="_blank" >RIV/67985998:_____/13:00391313 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.10.014" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.10.014</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.10.014" target="_blank" >10.1016/j.geb.2012.10.014</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Reversibility in dynamic coordination problems

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

We study a dynamic coordination process in which agents are uncertain about the actions of their fellow agents, and anticipate strategically relevant information. Because of the uncertainty and learning, (ir)reversibility of actions has important strategic consequences. We find that the reversibility option can either enhance or hamper efficient coordination, and we characterize the direction of the effect based solely on simple features of the coordination problem. The analysis is based on the following generalization of the Laplacian property known from static global games: agents at the beginning of the dynamic game act as if they were entirely uninformed about the aggregate play of fellow agents in each stage of the coordination process.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Reversibility in dynamic coordination problems

Popis výsledku anglicky

We study a dynamic coordination process in which agents are uncertain about the actions of their fellow agents, and anticipate strategically relevant information. Because of the uncertainty and learning, (ir)reversibility of actions has important strategic consequences. We find that the reversibility option can either enhance or hamper efficient coordination, and we characterize the direction of the effect based solely on simple features of the coordination problem. The analysis is based on the following generalization of the Laplacian property known from static global games: agents at the beginning of the dynamic game act as if they were entirely uninformed about the aggregate play of fellow agents in each stage of the coordination process.

Druh

J_x - Nezařazeno - Článek v odborném periodiku (Jimp, Jsc a Jost)

CEP obor

AH - Ekonomie

OECD FORD obor

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Projekt

—

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2013

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Games and Economic Behavior

ISSN

0899-8256

e-ISSN

—

Svazek periodika

77

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

1

Stát vydavatele periodika

US - Spojené státy americké

Počet stran výsledku

23

Strana od-do

298-320

Kód UT WoS článku

000314734700018

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

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