Does anticipated regret really matter? Revisiting the role of feedback in auction bidding

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985998%3A_____%2F13%3A00392244" target="_blank" >RIV/67985998:_____/13:00392244 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="http://www.cerge-ei.cz/pdf/wp/Wp487.pdf" target="_blank" >http://www.cerge-ei.cz/pdf/wp/Wp487.pdf</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

—

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Does anticipated regret really matter? Revisiting the role of feedback in auction bidding

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

Does the type of post-auction feedback affect bidding behavior in first price auctions? Filiz- Ozbay and Ozbay (2007) find that such manipulation can increase bids in a one-shot auction. They explain this as an effect of anticipated regret combined withthe assumption that feedback directly affects salience of regret relative to material payoff. We revisit this important market design issue using four different auction protocols and a large sample of subjects. We do not find any systematic effect of feedback on the average bid/value ratio. This evidence indicates either the lack of anticipated regret or its manipulability by feedback in one-shot auctions.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Does anticipated regret really matter? Revisiting the role of feedback in auction bidding

Popis výsledku anglicky

Does the type of post-auction feedback affect bidding behavior in first price auctions? Filiz- Ozbay and Ozbay (2007) find that such manipulation can increase bids in a one-shot auction. They explain this as an effect of anticipated regret combined withthe assumption that feedback directly affects salience of regret relative to material payoff. We revisit this important market design issue using four different auction protocols and a large sample of subjects. We do not find any systematic effect of feedback on the average bid/value ratio. This evidence indicates either the lack of anticipated regret or its manipulability by feedback in one-shot auctions.

Druh

O - Ostatní výsledky

CEP obor

AH - Ekonomie

OECD FORD obor

—

Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/GAP402%2F11%2F1726" target="_blank" >GAP402/11/1726: Behaviorální Design Aukcí</a><br>

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2013

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů