Why can't a woman bid more like a man?

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985998%3A_____%2F13%3A00391319" target="_blank" >RIV/67985998:_____/13:00391319 - isvavai.cz</a>

Nalezeny alternativní kódy

RIV/00216208:11640/13:00423392

Výsledek na webu

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.10.002" target="_blank" >http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.10.002</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.10.002" target="_blank" >10.1016/j.geb.2012.10.002</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Why can't a woman bid more like a man?

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

We investigate gender differences and menstrual cycle effects in first-price and second-price sealed-bid auctions with independent private values in a laboratory setting. We find that women bid significantly higher and earn significantly less than men doin the first-price auction, while we find no evidence of a gender difference in bidding or earnings in the second-price auction. Focusing on the first-price auction, we find that, while the gender gap in bidding and earnings persists over the entire course of the menstrual cycle, bidding of contraceptive pill users follows a sine-like pattern throughout the menstrual cycle, with higher than average bidding in the follicular phase and lower than average bidding in the luteal phase. In comparison, pill non-users have a flat bidding profile throughout the cycle.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Why can't a woman bid more like a man?

Popis výsledku anglicky

We investigate gender differences and menstrual cycle effects in first-price and second-price sealed-bid auctions with independent private values in a laboratory setting. We find that women bid significantly higher and earn significantly less than men doin the first-price auction, while we find no evidence of a gender difference in bidding or earnings in the second-price auction. Focusing on the first-price auction, we find that, while the gender gap in bidding and earnings persists over the entire course of the menstrual cycle, bidding of contraceptive pill users follows a sine-like pattern throughout the menstrual cycle, with higher than average bidding in the follicular phase and lower than average bidding in the luteal phase. In comparison, pill non-users have a flat bidding profile throughout the cycle.

Druh

J_x - Nezařazeno - Článek v odborném periodiku (Jimp, Jsc a Jost)

CEP obor

AH - Ekonomie

OECD FORD obor

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Projekt

—

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2013

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

Games and Economic Behavior

ISSN

0899-8256

e-ISSN

—

Svazek periodika

77

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

1

Stát vydavatele periodika

US - Spojené státy americké

Počet stran výsledku

33

Strana od-do

181-213

Kód UT WoS článku

000314734700012

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

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