Rent-seeking in public procurement: evidence from the entry of political challengers at electoral thresholds

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985998%3A_____%2F15%3A00450093" target="_blank" >RIV/67985998:_____/15:00450093 - isvavai.cz</a>

Výsledek na webu

<a href="http://www.cerge-ei.cz/pdf/wp/Wp549.pdf" target="_blank" >http://www.cerge-ei.cz/pdf/wp/Wp549.pdf</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

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Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Rent-seeking in public procurement: evidence from the entry of political challengers at electoral thresholds

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

This paper shows that political challengers affect rent-seeking in public procurement. I use data from municipal governments in the Czech Republic to construct new measures of political rent-seeking in procurement and test whether the entry of additionalchallengers into municipal legislatures affects the rent-seeking practices. Because the entry of challengers is endogenous to the performance of incumbents, I predict the challenger entry using quasi-random variation in the vote share of challengers near the threshold in proportional elections. I show that legislatures with additional challengers allocate fewer procurements to political donors, double price savings in procurement and use more competitive procurement auctions. The entry of extra challengers leads to greater economic benefits in legislatures with fewer political parties and in legislatures entered by local-level political movements. My findings highlight the role of local-level movements in enhancing political accountabi

Název v anglickém jazyce

Rent-seeking in public procurement: evidence from the entry of political challengers at electoral thresholds

Popis výsledku anglicky

This paper shows that political challengers affect rent-seeking in public procurement. I use data from municipal governments in the Czech Republic to construct new measures of political rent-seeking in procurement and test whether the entry of additionalchallengers into municipal legislatures affects the rent-seeking practices. Because the entry of challengers is endogenous to the performance of incumbents, I predict the challenger entry using quasi-random variation in the vote share of challengers near the threshold in proportional elections. I show that legislatures with additional challengers allocate fewer procurements to political donors, double price savings in procurement and use more competitive procurement auctions. The entry of extra challengers leads to greater economic benefits in legislatures with fewer political parties and in legislatures entered by local-level political movements. My findings highlight the role of local-level movements in enhancing political accountabi

Druh

O - Ostatní výsledky

CEP obor

AH - Ekonomie

OECD FORD obor

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Projekt

<a href="/cs/project/TD020099" target="_blank" >TD020099: Empirické modely manipulace s veřejnými zakázkami: Evidence z České republiky</a><br>

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2015

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů