Political representation and public contracting: evidence from municipal legislatures

Kód výsledku v IS VaVaI

<a href="https://www.isvavai.cz/riv?ss=detail&h=RIV%2F67985998%3A_____%2F19%3A00517860" target="_blank" >RIV/67985998:_____/19:00517860 - isvavai.cz</a>

Nalezeny alternativní kódy

RIV/00216208:11640/19:00510877

Výsledek na webu

<a href="https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2019.06.003" target="_blank" >https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2019.06.003</a>

DOI - Digital Object Identifier

<a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2019.06.003" target="_blank" >10.1016/j.euroecorev.2019.06.003</a>

Jazyk výsledku

angličtina

Název v původním jazyce

Political representation and public contracting: evidence from municipal legislatures

Popis výsledku v původním jazyce

This study examines how partisan representation in multiparty legislatures affects direct expenditures, contract-allocation design and selection of politically-connected firms as suppliers in public procurement. For identification, I exploit quasi-random variation in partisan electoral outcomes near the effective representation thresholds in Czech proportional municipal elections. My regression discontinuity estimates suggest that partisan representation matters for public procurement: for instance, if local-level political parties barely enter legislatures at the expense of the national parties, municipalities decrease their direct procurement spending and allocate fewer contracts to the corporate donors of the national parties. Fewer contracts are awarded especially in pre-election years and in auctions restricting competition among procurement suppliers. The results are not associated with higher government fragmentation or selection of more competent candidates, but rather with reduced political power of the national parties.

Název v anglickém jazyce

Political representation and public contracting: evidence from municipal legislatures

Popis výsledku anglicky

This study examines how partisan representation in multiparty legislatures affects direct expenditures, contract-allocation design and selection of politically-connected firms as suppliers in public procurement. For identification, I exploit quasi-random variation in partisan electoral outcomes near the effective representation thresholds in Czech proportional municipal elections. My regression discontinuity estimates suggest that partisan representation matters for public procurement: for instance, if local-level political parties barely enter legislatures at the expense of the national parties, municipalities decrease their direct procurement spending and allocate fewer contracts to the corporate donors of the national parties. Fewer contracts are awarded especially in pre-election years and in auctions restricting competition among procurement suppliers. The results are not associated with higher government fragmentation or selection of more competent candidates, but rather with reduced political power of the national parties.

Druh

J_imp - Článek v periodiku v databázi Web of Science

CEP obor

—

OECD FORD obor

50202 - Applied Economics, Econometrics

Projekt

—

Návaznosti

I - Institucionalni podpora na dlouhodoby koncepcni rozvoj vyzkumne organizace

Rok uplatnění

2019

Kód důvěrnosti údajů

S - Úplné a pravdivé údaje o projektu nepodléhají ochraně podle zvláštních právních předpisů

Název periodika

European Economic Review

ISSN

0014-2921

e-ISSN

—

Svazek periodika

118

Číslo periodika v rámci svazku

September

Stát vydavatele periodika

NL - Nizozemsko

Počet stran výsledku

21

Strana od-do

411-431

Kód UT WoS článku

000485209400022

EID výsledku v databázi Scopus

2-s2.0-85067689951